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ABSTRACT
Historical and technological imperatives have led both the United
States and the Soviet Union to arra)>: their strategic nuclear forces in
triads of air, land, and sea launched ballistic missiles. This thesis
will focus on the sea-based legs of the American and Soviet triads, exam-
ining a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) that may be con-
sidered during the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) that are underway
in Geneva. Some proponents have argued that these CBMs, if implemented,
would strengthen each side's belief in the invulnerability of nuclear-
powered, ballistic missile launching submarines (SSBNs) , thereby increas-
ing strategic stability. These proposals seek to increase confidence in
SSBN survivability by managing both the employment of anti-submarine war-
fare (ASW) forces and the development of technology that could be specif-
ically directed against SSBNs. This thesis will consider the possible
effects that five different CBMs could have on U.S. perceptions of SSBN
survivability. These changes in perception will be measured against the
costs that might be exacted in other areas (e.g., tactical anti-submarine
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historical and technological imperatives have led both the United
States and the Soviet Union to array their strategic nuclear forces in
triads of air, land, and sea launched ballistic missiles. Deterrence
theory holds that neither side can rationally launch a first strike
with these weapons if it must conclude that enough opposing forces
would survive such a strike to launch a crippling retaliatory blow.
Strategic stability is affected by the strength of this perception—a
perception that can be weakened by the real or apparent vulnerability of
any leg in either side's triad. The SALT process has attempted to pro-
vide a negotiated foundation for mutual confidence in weapons capabili-
ties and, to a lesser degree, strategic intentions.
This thesis will focus on the sea-based legs of the American and
Soviet triads, examining a series of confidence -building measures that
may be considered during the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) that
are underway in Geneva. Some proponents have argued that these CBMs
,
if implemented, would strengthen each side's belief in the invulnera-
bility of nuclear-powered, ballistic missile launching submarines
(SSBNs) , thereby increasing strategic stability. These proposals seek to
increase confidence in SSBN survivability by managing both the employ-
ment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces and the development of tech-
nology that could be specifically directed against SSBNs.
None of the proposals that will be examined is new, since they have
all been discussed in the open literature since the early 1970s.
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However, because they may well become part of the START agenda, they merit
another look. The currency of these measures is demonstrated by a speech
that Leonid Brezhnev made to the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on
March 16, 1982, in which he said that the Soviet Union considered it "pos-
sible to agree that the missile submarines of the two sides should be re-
moved from their present extensive combat patrol areas and that their
cruises should be restricted by limits mutually agreed to." He went on to
say that Moscow was willing to "discuss the matter of spreading confidence-
building measures to the seas and oceans, ..."
This thesis will consider the possible effects that five different
CBMs could have on U.S. perceptions of SSBN survivability. These changes
in perception will be measured against the costs that might be exacted
in other areas (e.g., tactical anti-submarine warfare) by agreeing to the
CBMs.
The thesis is divided into five chapters that rely exclusively on
open, unclassified sources of information. After this brief introduction,
the second chapter reviews American and Soviet strategic doctrine in the
context of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) record. It will be
argued that the U.S. doctrine that provided the underpinnings for Wash-
ington's approach to SALT has evolved since those talks were concluded.
This change in doctrine will necessarily affect the approach that the
U.S. takes during START. Despite this shift in doctrine, however, the
SALT record is well worth examining because the agreements that those
talks concluded, as well as those that were almost reached, will serve as
a point of reference for START.
11

The third chapter will focus on current SSBN and ASW developments so
that the implications of the CBMs discussed in the fourth chapter will
be easier to understand. Both the hardware capabilities invested in the
SSBNs of the American and Soviet navies and the roles and missions that
are assigned to these forces will be outlined. Since confidence in SSBN
survivability is directly related to the effectiveness of the ASW forces
that can threaten those submarines, this chapter will also look at the
nature of the ASW threat that confronts each side's SSBNs.
Chapter IV looks at the five ASW-related, SSBN CBMs that are the sub-
ject of this thesis. The specific threat to SSBN survivability that each
CBM aims to ameliorate is described, and the details of the proposal it-
self are examined. Following that, the negotiability and desirability
of each CBM is considered from the American perspective, using the back-
ground provided in the previous two chapters as a starting point. The
fifth, and final, chapter provides a quick summary of the negotiating
position that the U.S. will probably take on each of the five CBMs should
they be brought up at START.
12

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I




II. THE STRATEGIC AND NEGOTIATING CONTEXTS
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1947 George Kennan's Mr. "X" article characterized the U.S. and
USSR as being adversaries in a long-term struggle. Although there has
been considerable debate since Kennan's initial thesis concerning both
the nature of the Soviet challenge and what the U.S. response should be,
that the Soviet Union is an enduring threat to U.S. interests has not
been seriously doubted. Successive strategic doctrines adopted by the
U.S. since the end of World War II have been built around nuclear weapons.
As a consequence, U.S. strategic doctrine and weaponry have necessarily
changed in response to an evolving Soviet threat. This process of adjust-
ment and accommodation has been shaped by an assessment of Soviet capabil-
ities and intentions, and it has been constrained by a variety of domestic
budgetary and political concerns. The inexorable press of technology has
also played a significant role in animating the strategic competition be-
tween the superpowers. Although a given combination of weapons can sup-
port a variety of strategic doctrines, the technical characteristics of
nuclear weapons necessarily limit the range of strategies that are
practicable.
This chapter will provide the strategic and negotiating contexts for
subsequent chapters by contrasting U.S. and Soviet perspectives on a
variety of issues in the debate that has surrounded the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT). This brief, chronological review will serve two
ends. First, it will highlight some fundamental differences between the
14

U.S. and Soviet approach toward solving the most basic questions of
national survival. Second, on a more specific level, it will point out
how these talks have affected U.S. and Soviet strategic force levels.
The SALT record is important because it will be taken as a precedent in
evaluating any bilateral SSBN confidence-building measures (CBMs) that
may be proposed during the current round of strategic arms negotiations.
Before beginning the review of the SALT record, the concepts of deter-
rence and stability will be examined, since the meanings attributed to
these terms necessarily shape the assumptions that are made in arms
control negotiations.
B. DETERRENCE AND STABILITY
Jordan and Taylor have described two general categories of nuclear de-
terrence: prewar and war-fighting. They note that the prewar deterrence
school has predominated in the U.S. since the mid-60s, observing that "by
1969 U.S. policy-makers had reached the conclusion that neither side could
'win' by striking first.
. . .
MAD seemed to be an acceptable nuclear
policy to both. It was assumed by Americans that, with no possibility of
'winning' in any meaningful sense, stability would prevail at the nuclear
strategic level even during crises involving the superpowers."
The second school, war-fighting deterrence, says that the Soviet
Union can be best deterred by a U.S. posture that demonstrates the capa-
bility to fight and win. Jordan and Taylor outline the argument offered
by advocates of a war-fighting doctrine:
(1) it is uncertain that Soviet leaders would be deterred from
striking first by the threat of a second strike against their
population and industrial centers, especially if they thought they
had acquired the capability of destroying in a first strike a large
15

part of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory force; (2) the choice of
responding to any kind of Soviet first strike by annihilating
Soviet cities presents an American president with an option he
might fear to take in view of the consequent destruction of U.S.
cities; (3) should the Soviets hold or develop a theory of victory
in nuclear war, the United States would be unprepared to conduct
such a war; and (4) U.S. programs designed to deter against Soviet
attack through MAD would not permit America to fight a nuclear war
and survive.
So, although the aim of both of these strategies is deterrence of
nuclear war, they go about it in very different ways. When the SALT re-
cord is considered below, it will be argued that the U.S. held to the
assumptions of the first school throughout the negotiations, while the
Soviets probably followed the second. However, it will also be suggested
that U.S. strategic doctrine has evolved to something that looks more
like the war-fighting school since the SALT II negotiations.
The concept of strategic stability is often used to describe the rel-
ative strength of deterrence and also to predict the effect that various
policies might have on deterrence (i.e., stabilizing or destabilizing).
Fritz Ermath has outlined the U.S. understanding of strategic stability
at the time of SALT I, describing it as a condition in which:
. . .
incentives inherent in the arms balance to initiate the use
of strategic nuclear forces and, closely related, to acquire new
or additional forces are weak or absent. In an environment do-
minated by powerful offensive capabilities and comparatively ul-
timate values, i.e., societies, stability was thought to be
achievable on the basis of a contract of mutually vulnerable
societies and survivable offensive forces. Emphasis on force
survivability followed, as did relative uninterest in counter-
force, active, and passive defenses.-5
Ermath speaks of stability as it applies to the use and the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons. The latter is also referred to as "arms
race stability." John Coyle has described arms race stability more
extensively as existing when "The situation as perceived does not
16

encourage increased nuclear force buildup to take advantage of a weak-
4
ness or rectify one." In other words, there are no "windows of vulner-
ability" on either side.
Gay Hammerman reviewed the mass of literature relating to stability,
and noted a distinction between "ordinary" strategic nuclear stability
and stability relating to the use of nuclear weapons in a period of
crisis:
If strategic nuclear stability may be defined as a low probability
of strategic nuclear war, crisis stability may be defined as a
high probability of avoiding a nuclear strategic war that appears
in danger of breaking out despite the fact that neither side
actively wishes it. To put it another way, crisis stability is
the low probability that one side will launch a first-strike
attack under the special circumstances of heightened tension and
hostility between the two sides. Among analysts and officials
who write about crisis stability, it seems generally agreed that
more is required to achieve it than to achieve ordinary strategic
nuclear stability (or deterrence stability) --more invulnerability,
more management skill, more effective intelligence and C3, and
perhaps additional missiles for a side inferior in numbers.
Weapons that are vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike are not crisis
stable, since they put their owner in the position of "using or losing"
them. Such weapons increase the incentives for both launch-on-warning
and first strike doctrines. Hammerman notes that crisis and arms race
stability do not necessarily coincide, as is the case where the "land-
mobile MX missile may be bad for arms race stability because of its verif-
ication problems, but as a weapon with high survivability and relatively
low provocativeness , it is very good for crisis stability."
Hammerman has nicely summarized the tenets of the "orthodox stability
doctrine" of the 70s in a vulnerability/invulnerability matrix reproduced
here as Figure 1.
17

US-Soviet Nuclear Strategic Stability as Expressed
in a Vulnerability/Invulnerability Matrix
Soviet Union




























WZZk - most desirable condition for both sides
Source: Gay Hammerman, Analytic Research on Strategic, Tactical
and Doctrinal Military Concepts, p. 69.
Figure 1
This concept of stability was a part of the foundation upon which the
U.S. approach to SALT rested.
C. SALT I
1. Background
U.S. recognition in the late 60s of the existence of a growing
Soviet second strike capability necessitated a change in the rationale
18

for, and targeting priorities of, U.S. strategic nuclear forces. By that
time Secretary of Defense McNamara had come to articulate a strategic
doctrine that acknowledged this shifting balance. He argued that for
nuclear war to be deterred, Moscow would have to be convinced that enough
U.S. weaponry would survive a Soviet first strike to inflict unacceptable
7
damage on the Soviet society in a retaliatory blow. Since unacceptable
damage was defined as destroying one fifth to one quarter of the Soviet
o
population, and one half of its industrial and economic base, emphasis
shifted from counterforce to countervalue targeting. However, McNamara 's
assured destruction went one step further by suggesting that deterrence
would be strengthened if both sides were secure in the knowledge that
each had a survivable second strike capability- -the mutual element of MAD.
Although the Johnson Administration's attempt to begin strategic arms
negotiations with the Soviet leadership was set aside because of the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Wolfe, among others, has noted
that the MAD formulation was to become the organizing principle of the
U.S. approach to SALT. 9
2. SALT I Limits
SALT I included two separate agreements. The first of these, the
ABM Treaty (anti-ballistic missile) , although subject to periodic review,
has no expiration date. In it, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to limit
the maximum number of ABM batteries that they would deploy to two. One
battery could protect the national capital, the other an ICBM launching
complex. A 1974 amendment to the treaty reduced the number of permis-




Unlike the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive
Arms had a five-year span. Its scope was limited to ICBM and SLBM
launchers in operation or being constructed in 1972. As the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has summarized:
... In 1972, the United States had 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs;
The Soviet Union, 1607 ICBMs and 740 SLBMs. Both sides were per-
mitted to expand their SLBM forces up to 710 and 959, respectively,
but only by dismantling an equal number of older ICBM launchers or
launchers of SLBMs on older submarines. *
Although U.S. superiority in MIRV technology, warhead accuracy, and heavy
bombers was supposed to offset the numerical advantages given to the
12
Soviets, Henry Jackson realized that these unequal ceilings could lead
to actual or perceived Soviet strategic superiority. Jackson introduced
an amendment to the effect that future iterations of SALT should not
codify Soviet numerical advantages.
3. U.S. Assumptions and SALT I
Strobe Talbott has compared SALT to a chess game where both players
attempt to play to a draw, since playing to win would be an attempt to
seek '"unilateral advantage' or 'strategic superiority'," which would
13
"violate the rules of parity and stability." Thomas W. Wolfe has ob-
served that many Americans assumed that Soviet attitudes toward SALT were
essentially the same as those of the U.S. He lists what these shared
goals were thought to be:
... (1) to freeze the strategic balance at the level of parity;
(2) to stabilize mutual deterrence; (3) to regulate the strategic
competition so as to reduce its resource costs , lower the risks of
accidental nuclear war outbreak, and discourage the need for new
cycles of improved strategic weapons systems.
Wolfe notes that these goals never enjoyed unanimous support on either
side; however, they are a good reference point in examining Soviet
20

attitudes, which were seen to differ from those of the U.S. as time went
on. Soviet goals in SALT were linked to the "detente diplomacy" that
sought to consolidate Soviet strategic gains by slowing down a possible
U.S. response to the Soviet buildup of the 60s. The extent to which
Soviet strategic doctrine and goals converged with those of the U.S. is
a matter of some debate in the literature interpreting SALT. This debate
is highlighted below.
4. SALT I and Soviet Acceptance of MAD
Raymond L. Garthoff has argued that by the time SALT was being con-
sidered, the Soviet political and military leadership had come to accept
the principle of mutual deterrence. As typical of this appreciation,
he points to the opening statement by the Soviet delegation to SALT:
. . .
evidently, we all agree that war between our two countries
would be disastrous for both sides. And it would be tantamount
to suicide for the ones who decided to start such a war.
Garthoff documents his contention with Soviet military and political
writings that either reflect concern over the devastating consequences
of nuclear war or suggest that the Soviet leadership is well aware of
the state of mutual deterrence that exists between the U.S. and USSR.
As he explains:
Mutual deterrence in Soviet writing is usually expressed in terms
of assured retaliatory capability which would devastate the
aggressor, because this foundation (rather than 'mutual assured
destruction' capability) is more responsive to ideological
sensitivity over the idea that the Soviet Union could be con-
sidered a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred- -only
adversaries
. . .
are described as potential aggressors. . . .
In addition, this formulation avoids identification with the
specific content of
1





Although Garthoff concedes that Soviet political leaders support the idea
that deterrence requires a strong combat capability in their programmatic
statements, he notes that they do not go on to discuss "meeting require-
19
ments for waging and winning a war." Garthoff implies that a signifi-
cant divergence may exist between Soviet military and political decision-
makers on matters of strategic doctrine.
In contrast, Fritz Ermath argues that the Soviets did not subscribe
to a strategic concept based on mutual deterrence in SALT. In explaining
the rationale behind Soviet acceptance of the ABM Treaty, a treaty that
is frequently cited as prima facie evidence of Soviet acceptance of
mutual deterrence, Ermath points out that other motives were probably
at work:
... It is much more probable, however, that the agreement was
attractive to Moscow because superior U.S. ABM technology plus
superior U.S. ABM penetrating technology would have given the
United States a major advantage during the mid-to-late 1970s.
In a unilateral sense, the Soviets saw the ABM agreement as
stabilizing a process of strategic catch-up against a serious
risk of reversal. But it did not mean acceptance of the U.S.
stability principle.
Stanley Sienkiewicz stresses that although the Soviet military does
not enjoy unilateral decision-making power in the area of national se-
curity affairs, the Soviet military does dominate virtually all aspects
of the national security process. This means that the range of accept-
able decisions to Soviet security problems is determined by the pro-
21fessional military. Sienkiewicz contrasts the Soviet approach to
national security problems, which emphasizes solutions devised by the
military, to that taken by the United States, where civilian strategists
predominate. As he remarks, "The notion of sufficiency or parity, on the




a civilian invention." At the negotiating level, Sienkiewicz points
out that Soviet acceptance of the U.S. formulation of deterrence would
require them to admit that Soviet ICBMs had violated the principles of
deterrence by threatening America's Minuteman force. As he concludes,
for the Soviets to accept the notion that neither side should threaten
the other's retaliatory forces "would have a major impact upon the most
important Soviet strategic modernization programs, and none of consequence
23
upon U.S. programs." ' Sienkiewicz is talking about the Soviet ICEM force.
Since Soviet ICBMs were attaining a counterforce capability versus U.S.
ICBMs, official acceptance of MAD would have put the Soviets in the po-
sition of admitting that their ICBM program was inconsistent with this
commonly accepted strategic doctrine.
Benjamin Lambeth has made a similar observation by noting that:
. . .
For Soviet planners, the very idea of 'control' is anathema
because of its implied relegation of Soviet security to imposed
arrangements requiring conscious Soviet self-denial and reliance
on the uncertain prospect of reciprocal enemy 'good behavior.'
This reluctance to countenance such restraints is a natural out-
growth of the Soviet Union's rejection of such Western concepts as
'stability,' 'mutual deterrence,' and 'essential equivalence,'. . . .
This intellectual outlook largely accounts for the emphasis placed
by Soviet military doctrine on the importance of maintaining a
capability for fighting a nuclear war in the event deterrence fails
and substantially explains the massive efforts the Soviets have
undertaken over the past decade to expand and modernize their
strategic and general -purpose forces. 4
If U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrines are fundamentally different, as
indeed they appear to be, what implication does this have for the suc-
cess of arms control agreements between the superpowers?
Sienkiewicz concludes that failure to reach a common understanding
between the U.S. and USSR on strategic doctrines does not necessarily
preclude meaningful arms negotiations, since the Soviets have proven
23

capable of reaching agreements that may vary from their military doctrine
(he cites the ABM Treaty). He also recognizes the possibility that some
agreements might be desirable from the U.S. perspective that would not
25
conflict with Soviet doctrine. Richard Burt puts it simply by comment-
ing that the ABM Treaty demonstrated "that nations can sometimes reach
agreement for very different reasons." He goes on to warn that since
arms control "is not a substitute for unilateral defense initiatives,
then the political price of negotiating the fielding of new systems must
be measured against the security that will be gained from their deploy-
ment." A few general impressions concerning SALT I's political price
are worth considering before moving on to SALT II.
5. Political Costs of SALT
Vernon Aspaturian' s analysis of SALT I's parity formulation
points to the strategic and political import of these negotiations:
. . .
The parity of SALT I was thus ascriptive and also normative
in the sense that the United States indicated that its policies
and behavior would correspond to a condition of parity rather
than superiority and that furthermore the United States was will-
ing to allow an ascriptive parity to be transformed into actual
equality. The superior qualitative [sic] ceilings permitted
Moscow in SALT I with respect to size and number of ICBMs and num-
ber of SLBMs, without demanding a freeze on qualitative improve-
ments were the bona fides that the United States extended to
Moscow to demonstrate its sincerity.
Aspaturian notes that the ceilings in SALT I were high enough to allow
the Soviets to make considerable strides within the limits of the treaty,
especially since it was "politically unlikely that the United States
could achieve and sustain the allowable ceilings," and there were "no
28
corresponding domestic restraints upon the Soviet side." Aspaturian
comments that criticisms of the ceilings in SALT I are really criticisms
24

of Kissinger's "diplomatic ineptness." Expecting the Soviets to seek
parity as an end in itself, which would have required them to limit their
efforts to the level that domestic U.S. political constraints allowed for
American forces, was unrealistic. Aspaturian faults the U.S. for not
holding up its end of the parity formulation (failing to build to the
allowed limits)
.
While a case could be made in the arcane language of megatons and
kill probabilities that U.S. forces remained more than sufficient for de-
terrence, there were other, important, ramifications of agreeing to Soviet
strategic parity. As Wolfe stresses in discussing the political im-
portance of the whole SALT process:
. . . What a gradual accession of strategic advantage to the Soviet
Union could mean thus needs to be measured more in political than
in narrowly military terms. Although not quantifiable, the polit-
ical effect of SALT outcome suggesting to other countries that U.S.
strategic power could be expected to decline relative to that of
the Soviet Union in the years ahead would certainly not be to
inspire confidence in America's standing in the world, but might
well be to damage it badly. In some sense, a phenomenon akin to
the 1978 decline of the dollar abroad could set in- -an inexplicable
flight of confidence despite a basically strong U.S. economy.
The unintended effects that arms control agreements can have on allies
must be one of the criteria that is used in evaluating such agreements.
The SSBN survivability CBMs that will be examined in Chapter IV will
touch on the possible effects that some of those measures could have on
U.S. allies. Nonetheless, SALT I was an interim agreement that recognized





Although discussion on SALT II began in November of 1972, the
Vladivostok Accord, signed by Ford and Brezhnev in November of 1974, was
the first concrete step made in negotiating SALT II. The accord answered
Jackson's earlier concerns about numerical equality by providing for
equal aggregate limits of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and
a 1,320 limit on MIRVed launchers, along with other negotiating princi-
ples. This early progress evolved into the long record of negotiations
that became the SALT II legacy. President Carter's 1977 attempt to vary
from the Vladivostok formulation with his proposal for deep cuts was un-
acceptable, and probably confusing, to the Soviets. Among other things,
Carter's proposal called for: a reduction of the Vladivostok aggregate
of 2400 delivery vehicles to 2000 or 1800; a reduction in the MIRV limit
of 1320 agreed to at Vladivostok to 1200 to 1100; a limit of 550 MIRVed
ICBM launchers; and, a freeze on new or modernized ICBMs, as well as a
31
prohibition on testing new ICBMs. By the time Carter signed SALT II
with Brezhnev in June of 1979, the provisions of the 1974 accord were
very much in evidence, along with a host of sub-ceilings on various sys-
tems. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan casting doubt on Moscow's
good intentions, and considering the uphill pull that would be required
to get a two- thirds vote favoring SALT II in the Senate, Carter asked the
Senate to defer further consideration of SALT II.
2. What SALT II Would Have Required
Although SALT II was never ratified, both the U.S. and USSR




follow it while the current (START/INF) negotiations are underway.
Since the Soviet Union's leadership is not subject to change every four
years, Moscow's approach to SALT can be more deliberate and consistent
over time than Washington's. The Soviet Union may not be very flexible,
at least initially, in varying from the understandings on strategic arms
that they thought they had reached with Washington in the arduous SALT II
negotiations. For these reasons, a short discussion of SALT II 's major
provisions is important.
SALT II was to have three parts: 1) a treaty based upon the guide-
lines of the Vladivostok Accord; 2) a three-year protocol, expiring on
31 December 1981, which stated that mobile ICBM launchers would not be
deployed, that long-range (greater than 600 kilometers) sea and ground
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs/GLCMs) would not be deployed, and that air-
to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) would not be flight tested; and 5)
a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent
negotiations. Other specific provisions of SALT II need not be re-
hearsed here.*5 However, it is important to note that SALT II was far
more ambitious and complex than SALT I had been, and its statement of
principles for future negotiations, which speaks to strategic arms reduc-
tions and resolution of the protocol issues (i.e., gray area weapons), sug-
gests that the ongoing negotiations will be even more difficult.
3. Driving the Soviets to Sea
Thomas Wolfe has argued that in SALT I the U.S. "cashed in its
Safeguard [ASM] chip, not only assuring the Soviets that the prospect of
area defense was largely foreclosed, but also ruling out the possibility
of a viable site defense of the U.S. Minuteman force." He suggests that
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the U.S. got little in return in SALT I to allay its major concern over
U.S. ICBM vulnerability. 35 Nonetheless, SALT, since the 1974 Vladivostok
Accord, has been seen as offering the potential to ameliorate the Soviet
threat to the ICBM leg of the U.S. strategic triad. Aside from the possi-
bility that the Soviets might agree to either numerical or throweight
limits on their ICBMs, this potential rests on the possibility that the
negotiating process can encourage the Soviets to move more of their stra-
tegic forces to sea. Presumably, the reduced payload and accuracy of
sea-based systems would limit them to a second strike, countervalue role,
thereby leaving U.S. ICBMs relatively more survivable. Wolfe notes that
the Vladivostok Accord's freedom-to-mix provision allows any combination
of systems under the 2400 aggregate ceiling. This would permit the Soviets
to move strategic forces out to sea if survivability became a real con-
cern. Of course, until the Soviets perceive their land-based forces as
being vulnerable, little incentive exists for them to move in that direc-
37
tion. And, even if they do come to perceive such a vulnerability, there
are other solutions to the problem (e.g., land-mobile ICBMs).
Strobe Talbott explains that the U.S. pursued a new-types ban on
ICBMs more actively than such a ban on SLBMs during the SALT II negotia-
tions because of this desire to lure the Soviets out to sea. Several fac-
tors seem to militate against the realization of this goal of moving more
of the Soviet triad out to sea at the expense of their land-based systems.
In considering the possibility of dismantling vulnerable weapons
systems as a way to achieve strategic equivalence, Richard K. Betts notes
that from the Soviet perspective, such proposals for ICBMs are:
. . .
politically fanciful, at least for the 1980s. Massive
investment in ICBMs makes it hard for the Soviets to divest,
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especially when the disparity in antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities favoring the United States makes the sea-based
elements seem less inherently secure to them than to us.
Another factor, beyond the U.S. ASW threat and Soviet sunk costs in
ICBMs, could make increased reliance on a sea-based deterrent unattractive
to the Soviets. Seen in the context of bureaucratic politics, Soviet
Navy gains in SSBNs/SLBMs could well be constrained by the budgetary ef-
fects that such gains would have on the other branches of the Soviet mili-
tary, particularly upon the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) . Although
Admiral Gorshkov has been successful in increasing the size of the Soviet
Navy's SSBN force, this does not appear to have been at the expense of
the SRF, which has also been modernized.
Finally, improved technology may invalidate the underlying supposi-
tion that moving the Soviet deterrent to sea will translate into a more
secure ICBM force for the U.S. With U.S. development continuing on the
counterforce capable Trident II SLBM, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Soviets will also be capable of achieving improvements in SLBM
accuracy and yield, which may eventuate in another threat to fixed, land-
based U.S. ICBMs. y
4. PD-59 and Arms Control
PD-59, the countervailing strategy, was signed by President Carter
on July 25, 1980. Although this targeting doctrine, which includes up to
40,000 Soviet targets, can be seen as the natural follow-on to the
Schlesinger Doctrine of flexible nuclear options that was embodied in
NSDM 242 (1974), PD-59 f s emphasis on Soviet military targets, as opposed




Desmond Ball has pointed out the effect that PD-59 had upon the
U.S.'s approach to arms control:
Much of the opposition to the original draft of PD-59 that was
prepared in early 1979 was based on arms control arguments. In
particular, Secretary of State Vance believed that formal approval
of the 'new' doctrine would endanger the prospects for SALT II.
President Carter's endorsement of PD-50 on August 14, however,
signalled the death knell of the arms control stance of his adminis-
tration; according to that directive, arms control was to be pur-
sued only insofar as it served broader U.S. national security
interests. In an environment of increasing Soviet military capabili-
ties, the technological momentum which produced greater counterforce
potential and more sophisticated C3 systems proved irresistible.
Under the Reagan administration there will be no attempt at resis-
tance; instead, the concepts that are embodied in NSDM-242. the
NUWEP and PD-59 will be pursued to even further extremes. *
By the time the Reagan administration took office, the orthodox
stability doctrine, which had been the underpinning for U.S. arms control,
was in a state of transition. Hammerman notes that "orthodox stability
depends upon cooperation by the Soviet Union in creating vulnerable popula-
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tions for both sides." In light of the Soviet strategic buildup of the




1. Lowered Expectations in SALT/START
Christoph Bertram sees arms control as a means to "control mili-
tary competition" --a framework of management in the context of strategic
nervousness.
J
This attitude toward the possible usefulness of SALT is
similar to one that Thomas Wolfe has described as being the middle
ground between those who view SALT as the way to end the arms race and
those who see it as a dangerous waste of time. He says that this school:
. . .
gives SALT good marks as a kind of continuous diplomatic





and for trying to establish broad parameters




However, Bertram is a little more ambitious. He goes on to recommend an
alternative approach to arms control that would limit missions (e.g.,
agreeing not to develop a first strike capability or an effective stra-
tegic ASW capability against SSBNs) , rather than concentrating on quanti-
tative limits that seek to reconcile fundamental asymmetries as the SALT
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negotiations have.
Although arms control may still be important as a framework for manag-
ing strategic competition, many commentators have noted that the exper-
ience of SALT II has lowered the expectations for future talks. Wolfe
sounds a weakly optimistic note:
But, if SALT cannot be expected to usher in the millenium, neither
can it be considered a fruitless endeavor. Politically, so long
as a kind of imperative exists to keep SALT alive, the spillover
effect will also help to keep Soviet-American relations from break-
ing down, which could- -in turbulent times- -prove to be one of
SALT'S more important contributions.
The political imperative for such talks waned in the face of Soviet
activity in Afghanistan and Poland; however, domestic support in the U.S.
for arms control negotiations has been waxing over the past year.
2. The Current Administration
If SALT I and II have been less than favorable to U.S. security
interests, as President Reagan certainly believes, how might the U.S.
approach future negotiations? Wolfe describes two schools of thought on
how to go about influencing the Soviets in arms negotiations:
. . .
The first holds that the United States can best persuade
the Soviet Union to move in the right direction by the setting
of a good example, by the practice of 'restraint' in its own
strategic programs and by advancing serious SALT proposals that
do not 'threaten' legitimate Soviet strategic interests. The
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second view holds that real incentives to bring the Soviets to
enter meaningful SALT agreements must pose unpalatable conse-
quences for failure to do so. These would include giving un-
equivocal evidence of U.S. resolve to carry out whatever
unilateral measures might be needed to ensure its security
and that of its allies, including programs that could threaten
Soviet strategic assets. '
Reagan belongs to the second school.
President Reagan outlined his zero option for European nuclear wea-
pons and his concept for strategic cuts under the START rubric in a
speech before the National Press Club on November 18, 1981. His START
proposal calls for significant reductions. If accepted, it would limit
both the U.S. and USSR to a total of 850 ICBM/SLBM launchers, deploying
48
a total number of warheads not to exceed 5000. While these proposals
may have been viewed, at least initially, by the Soviet Union as being
impractical in the same way Carter's deep cuts of 1977 were, Reagan has
backed them by a series of actions calculated to demonstrate U.S. resolve.
49
Figure 2 demonstrates unfavorable trends for the United States in
four measures of strategic weaponry. President Reagan's response to
these trends has been to increase U.S. efforts in strategic weapons--to
strengthen each leg of the triad. His decision to go ahead with 100 MX
missiles, the Trident II (D-5) missile, 100 B-l bombers while continuing
R£D on a "stealth" bomber, as well as a program of ballistic missile
defense R§D, place him squarely in the second of Wolfe's two schools.
His related decision to continue with U.S. production of the neutron
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Procurement of these weapons systems would be consistent with PD-59's
emphasis on flexibility. These new systems can also serve as potential
"bargaining chips" (incentives) that may persuade the Soviet Union that
the U.S. intends to redress the strategic balance. This can come about as
the result of a negotiated settlement at START that could reduce Soviet
weaponry to such an extent that the need for new U.S. weapons would be ob-
viated. Failing a negotiated settlement, the U.S. could proceed with pro-
curement of a sufficient quantity of new weapons to unilaterally redress
the balance. In any event, the new weapons are a key element in the cur-
rent U.S. administration's approach to arms control negotiations. For
instance, in the wake of the House disapproval of the MX request, Rowny
(head U.S. negotiator at START) explained "We're building a new missile
so that when we come down to these lower levels they [USSR] are not left
with powerful weapons and we're left with puny ones."
As to the arms control effort itself, Reagan has symbolized his dis-
satisfaction with SALT II by appointing two of its most vocal critics to
head up the START and INF delegations in Geneva. Edward Rowny, who is in
charge of the START delegation, was the JCS representative to SALT II. He
resigned just before the signing ceremonies to show his concern over the
52
agreement. Paul Nitze, leader of the INF talks, has long been an ad-
vocate of a hard-nosed approach to negotiating with the Soviets. As fur-
ther evidence of his unwillingness to foreclose any U.S. options, Reagan
decided not to resume talks with Britain and the Soviet Union on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Such a treaty could possibly interfere
53
with U.S. testing of new weapons.
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3. Arms Control and U.S. Security
The length of time that was required to negotiate SALT II far ex-
ceeded what had been required to reach the Interim Agreement of 1972.
The transition to the Carter Administration may explain part of this de-
lay, but in large measure it can be attributed to the fact that SALT II
had to deal with more substantive issues than SALT I did. With this ex-
perience as prologue, it seems reasonable to anticipate that START negotia-
tions may extend to the end of the decade, unless they break off in
frustration or a change in U.S. or Soviet leadership brings about new im-
peratives. Further, the progress of START is implicitly linked to the INF
talks—talks that are attempting to handle some difficult problems that
were set aside in SALT II in order to bring those earlier negotiations to
a close. Statements made by Eugene V. Rostow, ACDA's Director, to the ef-
fect that the U.S. is looking for new ways to count strategic weapons, and
hints that National Technical Means may have to be supplemented by some
form of on-site inspection to verify future agreements, adumbrate a long
54period of negotiations. Rostow' s answer to a rhetorical question points
out that the current administration does not intend to raise any false
expectations:
Are we going to reach an agreement with the Russians? I do not
know and I will not promise.
Whether Reagan will feel pressured to demonstrate progress in arms control
before the 1984 election remains to be seen. However, as Joel S. Wit
notes, "future arms limitation efforts should seek, among other objec-
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III. THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
A. INTRODUCTION
Although the SSBN plays an important role in the strategic triads of
both superpowers, the approaches that American and Soviet planners have
taken in structuring their SSBN forces and in defining SSBN roles and
missions do differ in significant ways. The degree to which SSBNs are
perceived as being vulnerable is necessarily based upon an assessment
that each side must make of the other's anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities. As with force structure and missions, differences in U.S.
and Soviet ASW capabilities lead to an asymmetrical assessment of the
seriousness of the threat to SSBNs, Some of the basic differences in
SSBN force structure and vulnerability will be examined in this chapter
in order to provide a point of reference for Chapter IV' s consideration
of possible bilateral measures that may be proposed to build confidence
in SSBN survivability. Such confidence is a function of the inherent
capabilities of SSBNs as limited by the effectiveness of the ASW forces
arrayed against them. The first two sections of this chapter will look
at the role of the SSBN in the American and Soviet navies by outlining
the strategic capabilities imbedded in the hardware of each force, and by
examining how SSBNs are employed in peacetime and how they may be used
during war. The final section will consider the relative vulnerability
of U.S. and Soviet SSBNs by focusing on the problem of strategic .ASW--the






Even though the United States is allowed as many as 44 SSBNs with
710 ballistic missile launchers under the provisions of SALT I, current
and projected U.S. SSBN levels are far below this limit. In 1982 the
sea-based leg of the U.S. strategic triad comprised 31 operational SSBNs
with a total of 496 launchers. This drop from the longstanding figure
of 41 SSBNs with 656 launchers is explained by DOD's decision to remove
the ten remaining Polaris SSBNs (Ethan Allen and George Washington
classes) from the strategic role, during FYs 80 and 81, before their Ohio-
class replacements were in commission. The first two SSBNs. of this
class, each of which carries 24 Trident SLBMs, have since been commis-
sioned, and the lead ship, USS Ohio (SSBN 726), will soon begin its first
operational patrol. Funding has already been authorized for a total of
nine Ohio-class SSBNs. Two more are requested in the FY 83 budget, which
2
forecasts a completion rate of one SSBN each year from 1984 through 1987.
There are only two basic types of submarine launched ballistic
missiles now carried in the U.S. fleet: Poseidon (C-3) and Trident I
(C-4). The Poseidon (C-3) became operational in 1971. By 1978, 31 SSBNs
had been converted to Poseidon with its MIRVed (multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicle) warhead and 2,500 NM range. The Trident I
(C-4) is the follow-on to Poseidon. Its 4,000 nm range is a significant
increase, and a stellar-aided inertial guidance system allows the
MIRVed Trident warhead to achieve greater accuracy, along with its in-
4
creased payload. The physical dimensions of the Trident I are compatible
with the Poseidon launchers: a program has been underway since the late
41

70s to refit twelve of the newer Poseidon SSBNs with the Trident I
missile. The first of these C-4 equipped Poseidons deployed in October
of 1979 and the twelfth Poseidon to be so refitted will be completed in
FY 1983. Table I summarizes U.S. SSBN force structure and capabilities
as they will exist in 1983.
Even with its improved accuracy and larger payload, the Trident I
is not adjudged to have a counterforce kill capability against hardened
targets such as ICBM silos. However, a follow-on to Trident I, Trident
II (D-5), is now being developed. With a tentative IOC of 1989, 6 this
missile will make use of the full launcher space available in the Ohio-
class SSBNs. This increase in payload will be complemented by an im-
7
proved guidance system whose exact nature has yet to be determined.
The net effect of these gains translates into an SLBM with a hard-kill,
o
counterforce capability. Although some unclassified government sources
9indicate that the D-5's range will be essentially the same as the C-4's,
estimates as high as 6,000 nm appear in the open literature. These
variances stem from technical decisions which still have to be made in
11
trading off payload for range.
Figure 3 depicts the sea areas from which successive U.S. SLBMs of
increased ranges can reach strategically important targets in the
Soviet Union. These ever- increasing ranges have given the SSBN force
greater operational and targeting flexibility, while vastly complicating
the ASW problem for the Soviet Union. Taken together, Table I and
Figure 3 provide a thumbnail sketch of the hardware limits of the U.S.'s
SLBM force. With these limits as a backdrop, U.S. SSBN employment




























































































































































Possible U.S. SLBM Launch Areas
NOTE: Contours are based on U.S. SLBMs of varying ranges. Targets are
assumed to be population and industrial centers within 200 miles
of the Soviet border.
Source: Herbert Scoville, "Missile Submarines and National Security"
in Progress in Arms Control? , Readings from Scientific







Although the open literature does not provide a detailed picture
of U.S. SSBN operations, enough information is available to outline their
employment. Their peacetime contribution takes the form of deterrent
patrols in which the submerged SSBN proceeds to a patrol station, where
it loiters in a state of readiness. At any given moment, approximately
12
55 percent of U.S. SSBNs are operating at sea. Soviet awareness of
this large, survivable force is thought to strengthen strategic nuclear
deterrence. The high operating tempo of the U.S.N. 's SSBNs is achieved
by a carefully orchestrated maintenance program coupled with the assign-
ment of two rotating crews (blue and gold) to each SSBN. Crews are ex-
changed when the SSBN returns to port at the end of its 60 -day patrol for
several weeks of training and maintenance. Trident submarines will have a
70-day at sea period followed by 25 days of refit in port. Crew endurance
is considered to be the dominant limiting factor for these submarines.
All 31 of the Poseidon SSBNs are operated in the Atlantic/Mediterra-
14
nean areas , which means that there will be no operational SSBNs in the
Pacific until Ohio makes her first patrol from the new Trident base in
Bangor, Washington. The 4,000 nm range of the C-4 allows it to reach all
Soviet targets from the Atlantic, and "almost all" of them from the
Pacific. Aside from the increase in patrol time, the longer range
missile has reduced the U.S.N.'s dependence on overseas SSBN bases as
points for crew exchange and maintenance. Use of the SSBN facility at
Guam was stopped in the fall of 1981, and Rota has not been used for SSBNs
since 1979 (at Spain's request). Holy Loch, Scotland is still in use;
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however, Kings Bay, Georgia will be the upkeep site for East Coast Tri-
dents, including the 12 Poseidons equipped with the C-4.
U.S. SSBN operations stress covertness. This goes beyond the sub-
mariner's penchant for painting over the hull numbers of his boat. At
the operational level it means that the SSBN on patrol remains aloof
from the rest of the fleet, since any interactions with surface units
would increase the chances of the SSBN's location being disclosed. Com-
mand and control systems for SSBNs may offer a vigilant adversary a
remote chance of discovering a U.S. SSBN. Although SSBNs can communicate
while submerged by trailing a long wire antenna or a communications buoy,
as well as through other systems that require them to operate either near
17
the surface or to break the surface with a communications mast, there
is some slight concern that the Soviets may develop new technologies that
could make trailed antennas detectable. ' Command and control does not
present a serious problem for peacetime SSBN operations; however, this
question becomes a critical issue when the SSBN's wartime employment is
considered.
3. Warfighting Role
After describing the U.S. strategic nuclear force posture as being
one that will achieve crisis stability, the DOD's Annual Report FY 1985
goes on to stress that "U.S. forces will be capable under all conditions
of war initiation to survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate in a way
19
that permits the United States to achieve its objectives." This
posture is consistent with the tenets of PD 59, which emphasize the im-
portance of having a multiplicity of nuclear targeting options. Beyond
their peacetime deterrent role, U.S. SSBNs have the "wartime missions of
46

strategic and theater nuclear strikes, as well as deterrence of further
20
escalation." These missions reflect a shift from the countervalue
(anti-cities) role that was assigned to the SSBN during the years when
U.S. strategic doctrine was based on mutual assured destruction.
The FY 8_3 Arms Control Impact Statements argue that current SSBN/
SLBM programs will not only provide the most survivable elements of the
U.S. strategic forces, but that:
These programs go beyond strict replacement of the present SSBN/
SLBM force in that they are intended to maintain the survivability
of U.S. strategic submarines and provide increased capabilities for
these survivable forces. Such steps to improve sea-based retalia-
tory capabilities are particularly important in view of the current
strategic imbalance with the Soviet Union and the increased capa-
bility of Soviet strategic forces against the U.S. strategic
forces --especially U.S. fixed land-based ICBMs. ^
Predictably, Trident II' s projected capability has not met with unani-
mous approval. Those arms control advocates who class any weapon with
counterforce potential as destabilizing see the Trident II as leading the
U.S. toward a first-strike doctrine, or at least toward a point where
Moscow might conclude that the U.S. had such a doctrine. As the SIPRI
1979 Yearbook argues
:
If survivability of both the submarines and their communications
system cannot be guaranteed, then there will be an increased
temptation to adapt the SLBM system as a whole for use in a first-
strike counterforce role. In other words, the SLBMs will be re-
directed against the missile silos and other strategic weapons
of the other side, instead of against cities, and preparations
will be made for launch of SLBMs to take place as part of the
opening move of nuclear attack. A counterforce doctrine is in-
herently destabilizing in that it creates pressures for both
sides to launch preemptive attacks, while the second-strike
doctrine, despite all its faults, does have defensive connota-
tions, and does seem to have a stabilizing effect.
Pressure to shift to a first-strike doctrine, then, is seen as a
function of SSBN survivability and command and control reliability.
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The ASW threat to SSBNs will be considered in the final section of this
chapter, but it's worth noting in passing that a disabling first strike
against U.S. SSBNs does not seem to be an immediate threat. As to the
command and control problem that would confront the National Command
Authority (NCA) following a nuclear strike, this is a very real, and en-
during concern--a problem that already faces all three legs of the triad.
The so-called decapitation of the NCA following a nuclear strike was
23
apparent during exercises conducted by the Carter administration. The
FY 83 budget request evinces a series of programs directed at correcting
these CCC§I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) de-
ficiencies. Nonetheless, since perceptions play such a key role in the
calculus of deterrence, the considerable effort that the U.S. Navy has
put into building a redundant command and control system for the SSBM
should demonstrate Washington's commitment to reserving the SSBN force
for the retaliatory roles described above. This elaborate network will
not be rehearsed here; however, the Navy's TACAMO (take charge and move
out) aircraft are a highly visible example of this commitment. The TACAMO
(EC -130) is intended to be the primary means of communicating nuclear
release orders from the NCA to the SSBNs, even in the event that land-
based systems have been destroyed. To this end, a TACAMO is continuously
airborne in the Atlantic, and 18 more of these aircraft are going to be de-
ployed to provide coverage for the Pacific's growing Trident fleet by
25
mid-83. The SIPRI assessment cited above implies that the opposing
triads are in a stable balance, but other interpretations are possible.
The FY 1983 Arms Control Impact Statement concludes that the Trident II
provides a "hedge against vulnerability of other legs in the Triad,"
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and that this "SLBM would also enhance crisis stability insofar as it
would contribute to an enduring retaliatory force that could inflict
damage across the spectrum of Soviet targets."
C. SOVIET SSBNS
1. Capabilities
Under the provisions of SALT, the USSR is allowed 62 "modern1 *
ballistic missile launching submarines and as many as 950 launchers.
Use of the qualifier "modern" reflects a rather confusing counting regi-
men, in which the Yankee and Delta classes of SSBNs are tallied to reach
62, while the 950 SLBM figure is arrived at by counting all Soviet SLBM
launchers starting with the SS-N-5, excluding the 39 SS-N-5s that are
27
carried on the diesel powered G-II submarines. This means that the
28
launchers in 71 Soviet submarines are counted against the SALT limits.
Unlike the U.S. Navy, the Soviet Navy (VMF: Voenno-Morskoi Flot) has
been at its SALT limit since 1980. Staying at this level has required
the Soviets to remove seven Yankees from the strategic role to compen-
sate for the addition of Delta Ills, even though the removed Yankees
29had some years of service life remaining. The discussion that follows
will emphasize Yankee and Delta SSBNs because they carry the majority
of the VMF's strategically significant SLBMs (note: Table II summarizes
Soviet SSBNs/SLBMs)
.
Introduced in 1968, each SSBN of the Yankee class is capable of a
submerged launch of 16 SS-N-6s. Having peaked at 34 boats in 1974, the
Yankee class now numbers about 23. The liquid-fueled SS-N-6 origin-
ally had a 1300 nm range, but subsequent modifications have succeeded
49

in pushing the range out to 1600 nm. The Military Balance 1981-1982
still indicates 'that some of the shorter range variants (mods 1 § 2) are
31in use, but presumably these less capable missiles are being phased
out with the Yankees that are removed from the strategic role. One
Yankee became a one submarine class, the Yankee II, when it was equipped
with 12 of the VMF's first solid-fueled SLBMs--the 2700 nm, MIRV tested
SS-NX-17. 32
The first of the Soviet Deltas appeared in 1973, fitted with 12
SS-N-8s, a two-staged, liquid-fueled SLBM whose 4,000 nm range was a
33
significant advance. The Delta II followed in 1976, carrying 16 of
the SS-N-8s. In 1978 the Delta Ills and their 16 SS-N-18s became opera-
tional, marking the beginning of MIRVed SLBMs in the VMF. Although the
34
SS-N-18 has been flight-nested with as many as seven reentry vehicles,
The Military Balance 1981-1982 credits this 4,000 nm plus missile with
35
three reentry vehicles. Unclassified DOD sources state that the
SS-N-18 has three different versions that offer flexibility in payload
and range with a choice of 1, 3, or 7 MIRVs possible. These and
other Soviet SSBN/SLBM characteristics are summarized in Table II. The
yields of Soviet SLBMs are generally higher than those of the U.S. but
they are not as accurate as American SLBMs. After pointing out the
speculative nature of some of the figures used in their lethality com-
putations, The SIPRI Yearbook 1979 credited the U.S. SLBMs with "vastly
37
greater effectiveness" in hard target kill potential. However, the
SIPRI calculations of 1978 do not include the SS-N-18, a significant
addition to Soviet SLBM lethality. Also, it should be remembered that
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Even though the VMF continues to build Delta Ills, in 1980 they
38launched a new class of SSBN designated as the Typhoon. This SSBN is
expected to become operational in the mid-1980s, equipped with 20 new
SLBMs (SS-NX-20) carried forward of its sail. This solid-fueled, MIRVed
39
missile is expected to be at least as capable as the SS-N-18. Typhoon
is also notable for its size. At 25,000 tons, it is the world's largest
submarine, but as Daniel and Neely note, "America's Ohio (SSBN- 7 26) -class
Trident submarine has four more launchers on a platform two-thirds of
the 'Typhoon's' size." Figure 4 depicts the sea areas from which Soviet
SLBMs of varying ranges can strike strategically significant targets in
the United States. Deltas can strike targets in the U.S. from the rela-
tive safety of Soviet home waters, while Yankees would have to break
through Western ASW chokepoint defenses to hit the U.S. , if they were
not in position before the start of hostilities.
Table II and Figure 4 provide a broad summary of the hardware capa-
bilities of the VMF's fleet of SSBNs. Although there are obvious paral-
lels between the U.S. and Soviet SSBN/SLBM programs, the Soviet Navy's
operational use of its force is markedly different from that of the
United States Navy.
2. Peacetime Deployment
The Soviet Navy is divided into Northern, Baltic, Black Sea,
and Pacific Fleets. This division is driven by Soviet geography--a
factor that commentary on the Soviet Navy invariably mentions. Com-






Possible Soviet SLBM Launch Areas
NOTE: Contours based on Soviet SLBMs of varying ranges. Targets
assumed to be within 200 miles of U.S. border.
Source: Herbert Scoville, "Missile Submarines and National Security"
in Progress in Arms Control , Readings from Scientific






1. the vastness of the Soviet Union
2. the geographic fragmentation of the Soviet Navy into four
fleets and one "squadron"
3. the existence of narrow straits through which her fleets must
pass to reach the open oceans
4. the northerly orientation, in latitude, of the Soviet Union
5. the distance of her fleets from major world oceans and
shipping lanes.
However, the VMF has been able to compensate for these constraints to a
degree, in some cases turning them to its advantage. The VMF's SSBN em-
ployment strategy has been shaped by geographic limits, but the Soviet
Navy has made a virtue of necessity by using their geography to opera-
tional advantage. For instance, the SIPRI Yearbook 1982 suggests that
the "Typhoon may be deployed under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, as fur-
42
ther protection against U.S. anti-submarine tactics." ' Also, Hamlin
Caldwell, a senior naval analyst with BDM Corp., has pointed out that the
U.S.'s acoustic advantage "counts for less in shallow Soviet home waters
(where SSBNs may be) where all sonar performance is degraded and our
43
margin of relative superiority shrinks proportionately."
With the exception of the diesel -powered Golfs in the Baltic, Soviet
SSBNs are split in about a two-to-one ratio between the Northern and
Pacific Fleets . The Military Balance 1981-1982 counts 45 SSBNs in the
44Northern Fleet and 24 in the Pacific Fleet. As Daniel explains in com-
menting upon the emphasis given to the Northern Fleet: "This is prob-
ably due to Soviet conceptions of wartime and peacetime geographic
priorities, and to the fact that important naval design or production
45facilities are located in the western USSR." A quick review of Soviet
54

peacetime SSBN operations reveals a pattern that is very different from
that of the U.S.N.
The Yankee class began patrolling the Atlantic in 1968, "periodic-
ally coming within range of U.S. cities," and in 1971, Yankee patrols
began in the Eastern Pacific, posing a threat to cities on the west coast
46
of the United States. As Figure 4 shows, the longer range SLBMs
carried in the Deltas means that they are on station while in their home
waters. However, in contrast to U.S. practice, and despite the larger
number of SSBNs in the Soviet inventory, only ten to fifteen percent of
this force is actually out at sea on any given day. The Soviet Armed
Forces Review Annual 1980 translated this percentage into an average at
sea force of "nine or more Yankee and Delta SSBNs, and one older diesel-
powered Golf."47 The FY 1983 U.S. Military Posture Statement notes the
routine presence of Yankees in the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific,
and it states that Deltas are "normally on patrol in the Greenland, Nor-
wegian, and Barents Seas," and Delta I/III SSBNs are "routinely on patrol
48
in the Pacific." This relatively low peacetime operating tempo for
49
SSBNs has been consistent, even during periods of heightened tension.
In commenting upon Moscow's willingness to allow 85 to 90 percent of
its SSBN force to remain in port, where it is potentially vulnerable to
a surprise attack, Joel S. Wit has suggested that the Soviet's low SSBN
operating tempo is "largely due to a shortage of trained crews and to in-
adequate maintenance facilities." Although it is true that the VMF
has not adopted a blue and gold crewing concept for its SSBNs like that
of the U.S.N. , it seems likely that a lack of trained manpower would not
prevent the Soviet Navy from keeping a higher proportion of its SSBNs at
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sea in peacetime, if they calculated that the "correlation of forcers"
required such an action in order to deter the United States. A similar
argument runs counter to the charge of inadequate maintenance facilities.
While building something and making it work are not the same thing, given
the demonstrated capacity of the Soviet industrial base to turn out a
large fleet of nuclear submarines over a relatively short time, it seems
unlikely that a lack of maintenance facilities would prevent the VMF
from keeping more SSBNs at sea if it were deemed to be a strategic necess-
ity. This is not to say that SSBN manning and maintenance do not present
problems for the VMF, as indeed they do for the U.S., but rather , that
these factors are not the overriding determinants of Soviet SSBN
employment.
Part of the difference between U.S. and Soviet peacetime SSBN opera-
tions may be explained by the asymmetrical makeup of the superpower's
strategic triads. U.S. planners have placed great emphasis on the SSBN's
survivability to provide the underpinning for deterrence. Growing concern
over the putative vulnerability of the Minutemen has led the U.S. to an
even heavier reliance on its sea-based leg. The Soviets, however, rely
most heavily upon their massive ICBM force in deterring the United States.
Whereas America's inventory of strategic nuclear warheads shows 50 percent
on SSBNs, 11 percent on bombers, and 23 percent on ICBMs, the Soviet Union
deploys 72 percent of its warheads on ICBMs, 25 percent on SLBMs, and a
scant 5 percent in bombers. At the operational level, it may be that
the U.S.N. 's advantage in ASW makes the VMF less than sanguine about the
open-ocean survivability of its SSBNs. At the most obvious level, the
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Soviets probably do not think that a pre-emptive, out-of-the-blue strike
against their SSBNs in port is a likely contingency.
3. Warfighting Role
The Soviet Navy's limited peacetime SSBN operating tempo, as well
as its preference for keeping its more capable Deltas in the relative safe-
ty of waters close to the Soviet homeland, is consistent with Western
estimates of the likely way that these SSBNs will be employed in the event
of war. A Western consensus holds that the VMF will attempt to establish
virtual sanctuaries in the Northern (Barents Sea area) and Pacific (Sea
of Okhotsk) Fleet operating areas, where a preponderance of Soviet ASW
forces and air cover would protect the largest portion of the Soviet SLBM
force. From a strategic perspective, after a decade of debate, many
analysts posit that this sanctuarized SLBM force will be withheld from
any initial Soviet nuclear strike for use as an intrawar deterrent and
for bargaining leverage during war termination negotiations. This assess-
ment differs greatly from analyses of the 1960s that saw the VMF's SLBMs
being used in conjunction with the SRF's (Strategic Rocket Force) ICBMs
in a coordinated, all-out strike.
Detailing the evidence that supports the shift in the Western esti-
mate of Soviet wartime SSBN employment is well beyond the scope of this
52
chapter. Nonetheless, a brief description of how the VMF has come to
rely on sanctuaries as a means of enhancing SSBN survivability will con-
tribute to an understanding of the Soviet perspective on SSBN confidence
building measures. Soviet SSBN strategy is necessarily related to and
affected by their estimate of SSBN vulnerability. Further, Soviet SSBN
withholding has implications for U.S. Naval forces, since such a practice
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means that most Soviet ASW assets would not be directed against U.S. SSBNs,
but instead, would be dedicated to defending Soviet SSBNs from U.S. ASW
forces in what is termed a "pro-SSBN" mission.
The Soviet Navy's shift to a more forward deployment of its forces dur-
ing the 1960s has been widely interpreted as being a defensive response to
the U.S. Navy's threat of a nuclear strike, embodied in carrier based
strike aircraft and Polaris SLBMs, on the Soviet homeland. This threat
eventually required the VMF to move its defensive zone out to a 2500 nm
53
radius--the range of the Polaris A- 3 (IOC 1964). Michael MccGwire, a
respected Soviet Naval analyst, sees this emphasis on countering the
Polaris threat as having provided the impetus for Moscow's heavy invest-
54
ment in surface ASW forces in the 60s. However, he says that the Soviets
probably became increasingly aware of the limitations that their ASW
forces faced in an open-ocean ASW mission against the Polaris threat. He
also notes that U.S. press reports in 1967-1968 describing two new classes
of American attack submarines gave Soviet planners great concern over the
future survivability of their Delta SSBNs, which were to become operation-
al in 1973-74. A third factor cited by MccGwire in explaining the Soviet
shift to SSBN sanctuaries concerns Soviet strategic doctrine: Soviet
planners came to accept the possibility that a war with the West might be
a protracted one with an initial conventional phase of some length, rather
than a short, spasm nuclear war. As MccGwire explains, the requirement
to defend Soviet SSBNs until their SLBMs were expended led the Soviets
... to the concept of deploying the submarines in defended
ocean bastions in the Greenland and Barents Seas and in the
Sea of Okhotsk. . . . This led to a shift in ASW emphasis
away from the eastern Mediterranean and Arabian Sea, to ex-
tending the inner defense zones of the Northern and Pacific
Fleet areas and to providing them with watertight defenses.
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Once the conventional phase of a war came to an end, these SSBNs would
then be available to participate in the Soviet's first strike in accord-
ance with their 60s mission of strategic strike.
An SSBN withholding strategy, however, takes the requirement for
sanctuaries beyond the initial nuclear exchange. Admiral Gorshkov,
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, published a series of eleven
articles in the Soviet Navy's professional journal, Morskoi Sbornik
,
over the period 1972-73. James McConnell's exegesis of these articles
led him to conclude that:
. .
. the content of the Gorshkov series reflects a Soviet
political decision to withhold a substantial portion of
their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from
the initial strikes in order to carry out 'deterrence' in
war, conduct intrawar bargaining and influence the peace
talks at the end of the war. '
In a subsequent study, Robert Herrick's reading of open Soviet litera-
ture led him to conclude that Soviet SSBNs do not play any significant
role with the SRF in an initial deep strike, further arguing that "a
protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in official force during the
'60s and '70s without interruption and continues up to the present (mid-
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January 1980)," and that this strategy would provide:
. . .
some semblance of an adequate mission for the SSBNs to
at least superficially compensate for their having only a
minor 'operational' strike mission at coastal mission targets
for the small part of the SSBN force maintained constantly on
missile-launch station and a reserve, backup mission for
deferred- strike in the contingency that the SMF fails to destroy
its assigned targets for the initial nuclear exchange. y
Although MccGwire does not feel that the Gorshkov series supports
McConnell's conclusion of a Soviet SSBN withholding strategy, he says
that it is rather likely that some SSBNs would be withheld, because sub-
marines are uniquely suited for such a role. MccGwire stresses that
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actual employment of Soviet SSBNs "will depend on evolving operational
requirements, the course and nature of the war, and the opportunities to
influence its outcome."
Before considering a representative warfighting scenario for Soviet
SSBNs, a brief mention of Soviet command, control and communications needs
to be made, since a strategy that contemplates withholding forces neces-
sarily makes greater demands upon the CCC§I systems. Like the U.S., the
Soviet Union has built a redundant communications system that includes
extensive land-based, as well as satellite systems (Molniya Series).
The SIPRI Yearbook 1979 indicates that the USSR is "probably heavily
reliant on VLF for strategic communications, with a backup provided by
HF and possibly by satellites." Their VLF system may be more extensive
than that of the U.S.; however, the VMF does not have an SSBN communica-
tions system analogous to the U.S.N. 's TACAMOS. The STPRI assessment
concludes that the "restricted variety of communication modes available
to the Soviet missile submarine is an important factor in degrading over-
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all system security compared with U.S. missile submarines." This dis-
parity may be overstated. The Soviet practice of keeping their SSBNs
close to home cannot but help their ability to exercise positive command
and control over these boats. Nonetheless, there is real uncertainty, on
both sides, as to whether CCC§I systems can support any strategy of es -
calation. With this caveat understood, Soviet SSBN warfighting can be
kept in perspective.
In considering how Soviet SSBNs would actually be employed in fight-
ing a war, it is useful to group them by location and type. Caldwell
sees four such categories:
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1. Deltas would be withheld in their well-defended sanctuaries
under the control of the General Staff for use in war
termination;
2. Deployed Yankees would move in to strike soft military tar-
gets in the U.S. (e.g., SAC bases, SSBN bases, command and
control facilities, etc.);
3. Yankees in Soviet home waters could be decoupled from inter-
continental systems for use in theater operations in what
McConnell has described elsewhere66 as an independent Euro-
strategic option; and,
4. Golfs and Hotels in the Baltic and Sea of Japan would be
used in support of theater operations.
The preceding sections have outlined the deterrent and warfighting
roles that the SSBN plays in the strategic planning of the superpowers.
To highlight sources of insecurity that each side may harbor concerning
the ability of its SSBNs to fulfill these roles, the following section
will consider the ASW threat to the SSBN. The sense of urgency that
either side attaches to establishing SSBN confidence building measures
will be largely determined by its assessment of this threat.
D. ASW AND SSBN VULNERABILITY
1. Tactical vs. Strategic ASW
In theory, anti-submarine warfare can be divided into two dis-
tinct categories based on the targets it is directed against. ASW whose
object is countering SSBNs is deemed to be strategic, while ASW that
attempts to protect merchant shipping or naval forces from submarine
attack (torpedoes and cruise missiles) is called tactical. ASW can be
further divided into area and point defense operations; the former seeks
to deny submarine access to large ocean areas through barrier operations
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designed to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs) , for instance,
while the latter attempts to defend transiting naval or merchant ships
from submarine attack by providing an ASW screen whose layers of fixed
and rotary wing ASW aircraft and hull borne sensors and weapons attempt
to fend off (destroy) hostile submarines before they get within weapons
ft!
range. The theoretical distinction between tactical and strategic ASW
is not so evident in practice. Area defense operations in the Greenland
-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, for example, could take their toll on
Soviet SSBNs in the process of screening NATO's Northern flank. Also, many
of the sensors and weapons systems in the ASW inventory could be applied
to either task. After discussing American and Soviet attitudes toward
strategic ASW in general terms, this section will look at the ASW problem
itself, from submarine detection through wartime destruction.
2. U.S. and Soviet Attitudes Toward Strategic ASW
To the extent that the concept of mutual assured destruction,
with its emphasis on survivable retaliatory forces, has informed U.S.
strategic doctrine, attempts to achieve the capability to simultaneously
locate and destroy a large portion of Soviet SSBNs at sea have been seen
as destabilizing and at cross purposes with MAD. For this reason, U.S.
ASW policy, at least in the unclassified sources, has attempted to por-
tray the American ASW effort as being supportive of a tactical, not
strategic mission. This has created a certain amount of ambiguity in
the U.S. Navy's ASW posture.
Although the DOD counted strategic ASW as a Navy task prior to 1965,
since that time it has not been an openly stated mission. Nonetheless,
a 1978 Congressional report stated that U.S. .ASW policies have
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consistently stressed damage limitation (i.e., anti-SSBN operations) as
one of the Navy's sea control missions, despite official reluctance to
69
openly discuss strategic ASW. The report goes on to explain that some
of this ambiguity is inherent, since the U.S. Navy's forward ASW strategy
against Soviet attack and cruise missile submarines in wartime would also
be a de facto anti-SSBN operation- -the U.S.N, sees all submarines as
fair game during war. Even though Deltas no longer have to transit the
ASW gauntlet that the U.S. and its NATO allies have established across the
GIUK gap, the report states "it is unlikely that the United States, despite
high risks, will permit either Soviet SSBN's or SSN's a safe sanctuary
inside the GIUK gap. Major assignments of the U.S. attack submarine
force include not only barrier operations along the periphery of forward
areas, but offensive operations in forward areas." Also, since Yankee
SSBNs may use their SLBMs tactically against U.S. carriers, operations
71
against Yankees could be construed as tactical ASW. The report argues
that the ambiguity between strategic and tactical ASW missions has also
been reflected in procurement policies: "Strategic ASW has improved and
acquired a strategic warfighting potential concomitantly with tactical
72
ASW improvements." So, although open U.S. statements concerning ASW
73
may not have differentiated between tactical and strategic, ASW, ' Soviet
SSBN employment practices suggest that the VMF has perceived itself as
being vulnerable to the U.S.N. 's potential for strategic ASW.
Unlike the U.S.N. , the Soviet Navy has not been reluctant to openly
state the importance of strategic ASW. Admiral Gorshkov has written that:
The effect of naval warfare on the course of the war as a whole
will be manifested primarily by the degree to which the Navy's
capability to destroy land targets and to undermine, the strategic
nuclear potential of the enemy at sea is realized.
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Despite the frequent emphasis given by the VMF to the anti-SSBN mission
in official writings, and notwithstanding Gorshkov's claim that Mon the
basis of the latest advances of science, technology, and production, the
mission to repulse and disarm [the U.S. SSBN threat] was accomplished
75
successfully," there are real limits to the VMF's strategic ASW capa-
bilities. Some of these limits were suggested in the earlier discussion
concerning the Soviet Navy's SSBN withholding strategy- -a strategy that
led the VMF to a pro-SSBN mission. The high proportion of Soviet ASW
assets dedicated to this mission would not be available for an anti-SSBN
role. As Nitze and Sullivan have remarked in commenting on the VMF's
ASW defense zones,
This concept has little relevance to the problem of detecting
Western SSBNs outside these areas, since the Soviets lack any
real open ocean ASW capability- -although they seek to develop
one. Meanwhile, there have been numerous reports over the last
ten years that the Soviets are attempting to trail Western SSBNs
with their nuclear submarines.
The U.S. N.'s relative advantage in strategic ASW capabilities will be-
come apparent in the review of the phases of the ASW problem that follows,
3. The ASW Problem
Countering a submarine threat, ASW's object, follows a logical
path from detection and classification of a submarine as hostile, through
localization, ultimately ending in an attempt at destruction. The in-
telligence effort that may alert ASW forces to a submarine's expected
movement can be considered as a preliminary or supporting phase. In
peacetime, and possibly during some transitional periods in wartime, a
lengthy tracking phase during which ASW forces remain in contact with a
target submarine may follow localization. A wide variety of ASW sensors,
fitted in an equally diverse number of platforms, are brought to bear in
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prosecuting the ASW mission. This treatment will only touch on those
American and Soviet ASW systems that can be brought to bear in the strate-
gic ASW problem. For this reason, neither carrier-based nor surface ship
ASW systems will be considered, even though they could play a role
against SSBNs under some circumstances,
a. Detection
While the initial detection of a submarine is the first
phase of the ASW problem, detection is something that also takes place in
subsequent phases of the problem, because the shorter range sensors on
air and seaborne localization platforms must acquire and refine a target
submarine's position to an accuracy that is within the limits of the
weapon that will be used against it. ASW systems are designed to detect
changes caused in the ocean environment by a submarine's presence --they
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are classed by how or what they sense. These sensors include:
1. Acoustic-- the majority of operational systems fall into




a) Magnetic--a submarine creates a magnetic field that
varies from the earth's magnetic field. Short-range
sensors taking advantage of this phenomenon are in
use on airborne systems, and magnetic detectors placed
on the sea-bottom at chokepoints could be feasible.
b) Electromagnetic (EM) --a ship in seawater creates its own
low frequency EM field, which is potentially detectable.
c) Thermohydrodynamic--The relatively warm water discharged
from a submarine's machinery cooling system or the mixing
effect of its wake creates thermal anomalies at the sur-
face that may be detected by infra-red systems. Also,
effects created at the ocean's surface (e.g., change in
wave pattern or height) may become detectable by satellite





d) Contaminant wakes --The nuclear reactors that power SSBNs
leave trace neutrons/radionuclides in their wake, which
may be detectable. For instance, Newsweek has reported
that in 1974 U.S. intelligence became aware of a Soviet
surface vessel successfully tracking a Soviet submarine
by contamination in its wake (a crash program determined
that U.S. submarines could not be tracked by the same
method—at that time). 8
e) Direct detection- -Blue-green lasers have the ability to
penetrate clear water to 100 meters. Continued laser
research could make some form of laser detection system
practicable.
With the exception of magnetic anomaly detectors, these non-acoustic
technologies are all in the R§D stage. Both the U.S. and USSR have ex-
tensive, highly secretive, R§D programs that have been attempting to come
up with a "breakthrough" in submarine detection for some time; however,
for the present, ASW is built around acoustic systems.
Acoustic systems are categorized as being either active or passive.
Active devices transmit an acoustic signal and then wait to receive a re-
turn echo reflected by a target submarine's hull. Active devices are gen-
erally of shorter range than passive devices, and they have the disadvantage
being obvious to their potential targets. Passive devices listen for
sound in water using hydrophones. The operating machinery aboard a sub-
marine and the cavitation caused by its rotating propeller are detectable
sources of sound that make up a submarine's acoustic "signature"; because
the physical condition of propulsion and auxiliary machinery and pro-
pellers varies with each submarine, passive acoustic information can be
distinct enough not only to identify the class to which a submarine
79belongs, but also to identify the individual submarine being tracked.
The simplified description of acoustic detection given above should
not leave the impression that ASW is a simple problem. The technical
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complexity of acoustic sensors and processors suggests the difficulty in-
volved in making use of sound in water. The velocity of a sound wave
(about 5000 feet/sec), as well as the path it takes, is highly variable,
depending upon the temperature, pressure and salinity of the water
through which it passes. Sea bottom and surface conditions cause sound
waves to be reflected and the presence of various biological and gaseous
80
elements in sea water can cause sound waves to be absorbed. Techniques
for forecasting the ocean environment are constantly improving, but a
submarine trying to avoid detection can take advantage of water condi-
tions, making it very difficult for an adversary to locate it. Further,
the trend toward a noisier ocean and quieter SSBNs (U.S. SSBNs are still
quieter than Soviet SSBNs) makes the problem of passive detection in-
creasingly difficult.
The U.S.'s forward ASW strategy relies heavily on its sound sur-
veillance system (SOSUS) for initial detection of Soviet submarines.
This passive system consists of fixed arrays of hundreds of hydrophones
on the ocean bottoms that transmit acoustic information to shore-based
centers, where high speed computers process the data and analysts examine
it for evidence of a submarine's presence. SOSUS arrays exploit the
USSR's unfavorable naval geography. They are reported to be located
. . . along both U.S. coasts to the Caribbean Sea and into the
Gulf of Mexico; in the passages between: Bear Island and the
northern shore of Norway; Greenland, Iceland, and the south-
western shore of Spain; in the English Channel and around Gibral-
tar; near Italy and Turkey; along the Aleutian Island chain and
the Kurile Basin to Japan; between Japan and Korea; and close to
Hawaii and the Philippine Islands
.
By ccnbining the information from several arrays, a submarine's position
82
can be determined to an accuracy of within 50 nm in the Atlantic,
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and New York Times has stated, for instance, that SOSUS detects every sub-
marine that enters the Atlantic from Murmansk. Concern over SOSUS vul-
nerability in wartime has prompted the U.S. Navy to develop both a mobile
array that can be covertly deployed in crisis areas to provide acoustic
84information (RDSS—Rapidly Deployed Surveillance System) , and a towed
hydrophone array (SURTASS) that will be trailed from specially designed
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surface ships (T-AGOSs) . As for the Soviets, they appear to have a
hydrophone array from the Kola Peninsula to Spitsbergen to protect the
Barents Sea, and they may have a system in the Kuriles; however, these
limited, defensive systems do not compare with the extensive SOSUS net-
work. Information provided by SOSUS allows an aircraft (P-3) or attack
submarine (SSN) to be sent on a "vectored intercept" to more accurately
locate a submarine--the transition from initial detection to localization,
b. Localization
(1) Aircraft . The U.S. Navy has twenty-four operational
squadrons of maritime patrol aircraft, each of which has nine P-3B/Cs,
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as well as two training squadrons and twelve reserve squadrons. These
squadrons deploy to both the Pacific and the Atlantic/Mediterranean. Al-
though it is common for a P-3 to be provided with SOSUS contact informa-
tion, these aircraft are fully capable of unassisted open ocean area
search and submarine detection/classification. Its listing under the
localization rubric is for convenience, since the P-3 is capable in all
three phases of the ASW problem. The P-3C has a flight endurance of up
to 16 hours and a patrol radius of 2380 nm. These aircraft carry a
variety of active and passive sonobuoys (48 externally loaded and 1 in-




submarines. This process is aided by an onboard digital computer. The
sonobuoys relay acoustic data to the P-3 where it is analyzed by highly
trained operators. The P-3 has a MAD (magnetic anomally detection) boom,
which it extends to help in localizing a submarine. It also has a surface
search radar capable of detecting submarine periscopes, as well as electron-
ic equipment that can alert it to any use of radar by a surfaced submarine.
The Soviet Navy's primary air ASW assets consist of fifty TU-95 Bear
89
Fs and a like number of IL-38 Mays. Neither of these approaches the
sophistication of a P-3. The 1500 nm radius of the IL-38s limits them to
the Soviet ASW defensive zone, and while the Bear F's 5-4,000 nm range is
sufficient for open ocean ASW, the small inventory of these aircraft means
90
that a sustained effort to locate U.S. SSBNs would not be practicable.
Soviet airborne ASW versus U.S. SSBNs is handicapped by the lack of a de-
tection system comparable to SOSUS, by the large ocean areas that they
would have to search to locate U.S. SSB'Ns, and by the relatively limited
number of assets that they have available. What assets they do have would
probably be used in the ASW defense of Soviet SSBN sanctuaries.
While the disparity between Soviet and American air ASW assets is
significant, the VMF's deployment of its Deltas in heavily defended ASW
sanctuaries does mitigate the impact that this imbalance might otherwise
have on strategic ASW. For example, a P-3 attempting to prosecute a Soviet
SSBN in one of these areas would be very vulnerable to surface and air-
launched missiles, notwithstanding its recently acquired ability to defend
itself from surface attack by using Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles.




(2) SSN. Covertly operating at the same depths as the quarry
it seeks, the nuclear attack submarine is a most capable system for tacti-
cal and strategic ASW. In an anti-SSBN role, SOSUS or intelligence
(e.g., AGIs, satellites, etc.) may give the estimated position of a target
SSBN to the SSN, or the SSN may attempt to patrol the approaches to an ad-
versary's SSBN bases, seeking to gain contact with an SSBN shortly after
it puts to sea.
The U.S. Navy has about eighty SSNs. Although some of these attack
submarines are now tasked with direct support missions, in which they are
one element in the coordinated ASW defense-in-depth of a carrier battle
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group, the majority is still dedicated to forward ASW operations. The
FY 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement noted that the SSN "often
puts itself in and operates in areas which are very contiguous with the
92home bases of an adversary."
The overlap between tactical and strategic ASW that is inherent in
the U.S.'s forward ASW strategy has been noted. The Navy's Los Angeles-
class (SSN-688) attack submarine was developed to support U.S. aircraft
carriers by countering the Charlie (SSGN) and Victor (SSN) classes that
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the VMF began commissioning in the late 60s, but it could also be em-
ployed in anti-SSBN operations. With funding for thirty-nine SSN-688s
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already authorized, and fifteen more requested in the FY 83 budget,
the Los Angeles-class will eventually outnumber the thirty- seven Sturgeon-
class attack boats.
The Los Angeles' digital sonar system (AN/BQQ5) is a significant
improvement over earlier analog sonars, particularly in its passive de-




designed to spoof sonars. The AN/BQQ-5 will be backfitted into the
Sturgeon-class SSNs during future overhauls. In 1978, a Congressional
report claimed that "The result of U.S. superiority in digital computer
technology and electronics may be an SSN capability to trail Soviet sub-
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marines without their knowledge." However, this may be an exaggeration,
since decoying, deception, and the support of submarines friendly to the
SSBN could readily frustrate an attempt at passive trailing.
The Los Angeles -class is also going to be fitted with Tomahawk cruise
missiles. Initially they will be fired from the 688 's four existing tor-
pedo tubes, but new construction 688s are being modified to include a
vertical launch system in their bows, which will also be backfitted in
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earlier 688s. Since the Tomahawk has both land attack and anti-ship
versions, U.S. SSNs could acquire a variety of missions that would capi-
talize on the targeting flexibility inherent in cruise missiles. In some
sense these new missions could be seen as competing with the SSN's carrier
support mission and any anti-SSBN mission.
The diversity of the Soviet Navy's non-strategic submarine force makes
it somewhat more difficult to categorize than the U.S. Navy's. Of 190
attack submarines in its inventory, 52 are nuclear powered (SSNs) , with
the remainder being diesel boats (SSs) . The VMF also has 69 cruise-
missile launching submarines: 47 are nuclear -powered (SSGNs) and 22 are
98diesel boats. The VMF's cruise missile launching submarines are de-
signed for use against U.S. carriers and major combatants, while the
majority of the attack submarines are dedicated to the pro-SSBN (i.e.,





While the U.S. has only recently included the direct support mission
for submarines, the VMF has long shown a preference for operating its sub-
marines with other forces in coordinated ASW. For example, Polmar suggests
that once a Soviet SSN detects an opposing submarine, it "would probably
withdraw to permit surface or air attack without risk to the Soviet sub-
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marine." Of course, Soviet general -purpose submarines would also be
used to help other VMF units get past the GIUK gap so that they could per-
form missions in other theaters.
Nonetheless, despite the varied and capable weapons carried in the
VMF's 250 plus general -purpose submarines, in the context of the strategic
ASW mission against U.S. SSBNs, this force would be largely ineffectual.
At the tactical level, the same acoustic advantage that U.S. SSBNs enjoy
over those of the VMF shows up in a comparison of attack submarines:
Soviet SSNs are noisier and their sensors are of shorter ranges. The strate-
gic reasons that explain the security of U.S. SSBNs on patrol in the open
ocean have been detailed above in the comparison of U.S. and Soviet em-
ployment practices and detection capabilities. However, Soviet ASW forces
would present a formidable problem for U.S. SSNs on an anti-SSBN mission
within the Soviet defensive zone,
c. Kill
Localization platforms carry the weaponry to sink submarines.
The P-3 can hold up to 12 Mk 46 torpedoes, and the U.S. Navy's attack
submarines typically have four, 21 inch torpedo tubes from which they
launch either the Mk 48 torpedo or a submarine rocket (SUBROC) . The Mk
46 is a short, acoustically guided torpedo, while the Mk 48, a much
heavier and longer torpedo, combines wire guidance with active/passive
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acoustic search to make it "probably the most capable torpedo in service
with any navy." U.S. SSBNs carry these torpedoes for self-protection.
The Soviet's IL-38 May carries torpedoes in its weapons bay and the Bear
F has both torpedoes and ASW depth bombs. All of the VMF's submarines
have torpedoes, and some newer classes (Alfa, Victor, and Tango) may
carry ASW missiles (SS-N-15/SS-NX-16)
.
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The SS-N-15 is estimated to
have a nuclear capability and range similar to SUBROC, while the SS-NX-16
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is more along the lines of an acoustic torpedo. Both sides also have
ASW mines that could be used for chokepoint barriers. The U.S. Navy's
CAPTOR is a bottom anchored, deepwater mine that acoustically detects
hostile submarines, and then fires a Mk 46 torpedo. ^ The VMF stresses
mine warfare and is capable of laying mines from a wide variety of plat-
forms. A barrier of mines could be laid to augment the ASW defense of
Soviet SSBN sanctuaries.
The single- shot kill probability of any of these torpedoes is less than
one. After commenting on the "good news" that the Mk 48 torpedo can search
out almost twenty times more ocean volume than its Soviet competition can,
Captain Patton (a former SSN CO.), points out the "bad news" that because
of the Soviet's appreciation of overwhelming firepower they would "con-
sider it a beneficial trade-off if a Soviet 'Victor' -class nuclear powered
attack submarine (SSN) emptied her torpedo room in return for one Los
Angeles-class SSN kill when the latter platform's one-bullet attack was
made with a torpedo with a defective exploder mechanism." "One-bullet"
may be hyperbole, but others have also pointed to a possible U.S. shortfall
in this area. Caldwell has said that firepower "is the primary deficiency
of the U.S. Navy attack submarine force," noting that the U.S.'s first-line
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attack boats only have four torpedo tubes, arguing that to make "strate-
gic ASW and a forward strategy work we need a true tactical missile attack
submarine that can carry and quickly launch a lot of weapons at a wide
range of targets afloat and ashore." There has also been some specu-
lation that the advanced lightweight torpedo being developed to replace
the Mk 46 may not have enough explosive punch to penetrate double-hulled
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Soviet SSBNs/SSNs. The greater firepower of nuclear ASW weapons allows
them a larger margin of error in their firing solution, but there is not
much operational experience with these weapons. The point is that even
after a submarine is localized its destruction cannot be considered to be
a certainty.
4. SSBN Vulnerability to a Preemptive Strike
Even if the probability of kill in a scenario in which an SSN
launches a surprise attack against an SSBN that it has succeeded in locali-
zing were very high, as it well may be, the difficulties inherent in
attempting to translate this one-on-one capability into the potential for
a coordinated, preemptive attack against an adversary's entire SLBM force
would be very great indeed. The uncertainties involved in each of the
phases of the ASW problem would have to be multiplied together to come up
with the overall probability of success of an attempt at preemption. None-
theless, the confidence -building measures that will be considered in
Chapter IV deal more with perceptions of vulnerability than they do with
actual capabilities.
The survey of the ASW problem in the foregoing sections leads to the
conclusion that the United States enjoys a real advantage in ASW vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union. Confidence in U.S. SSBN survivability has been a
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consistent and frequent theme in open U.S. sources. The Fiscal Year 1983
Arms Control Impact Statements note that existing U.S. SSBNs "possess an
extremely high degree of survivability. No impending Soviet ASW develop-
108
ment seems likely to pose a significant threat to Trident." The sur-
vivability of Soviet SSBNs in the face of an improving U.S. ASW capability
is a matter of some speculation. A 1978 Congressional report notes the
U.S.'s potential for strategic ASW may be destabilizing in the context of
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a strategic doctrine based on mutual assured destruction. Even if U.S.
strategic doctrine has evolved past MAD, as Chapter II argues, measures
that may assure either side of the survivability of its SSBNs could still
contribute to strategic stability. If START were to achieve a schedule
of reductions in the superpower triads, SSBN confidence-building measures
could take on added importance, since the perceived vulnerability of any
leg in a quantitatively smaller triad would be of even greater strategic
significance
.
The ASW related confidence-building measures that will be considered
in Chapter IV address two areas of potential SSBN vulnerability- -the
first of these is that one side will develop the capability to preemptive-
ly destroy the other's SSBNs in what Richard Garwin has described as "an
attack without warning and so concentrated that the force is entirely
gone before the government learns of the problem and can launch those
missiles against strategic or military targets." Garwin has identified
several tools that, if acquired by either side, could eventuate in this
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capability:
1. area search- -the ability to search large ocean areas, localize
enemy submarines, and destroy them in a time urgent fashion.
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2. trailing- -maintaining a continuous SSN trail on an adversary's
SSBNs in order to be in a position to strike on command.
3. belling- -covertly tagging an enemy SSBN as it leaves port
with a device which would disclose the SSBN's location.
The second concern that SSBN confidence -building measures address is the
problem of crisis management and controlling escalation of conventional
war- -whether or not to attempt to avoid the attrition of SSBNs during con-
ventional war. Chapter IV will examine a series of proposals in detail
that have been suggested as a way of lessening the potential threat to
SSBN survivability in these two areas (note: the belling problem will not
be treated- -adequate protection against this threat is a function of each
side's physical security program.)
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IV. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES FOR SSBN SURVIVABILITY
A. CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
Confidence building "involves the communication of credible evidence
of the absence of feared threats." This art has long been practiced
by statesmen and strategists; however, in its current usage, the concept
of CBMs was given formal expression in 1975 in the Final Act of the
Helsinki Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) . Signatories to the Final Act agreed to notify each other prior
to staging any troop maneuvers in Europe that involved more than 25,000
men in order to promote "mutual understanding and the strengthening of
confidence, stability and security." Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director
of IISS, has explained that two kinds of reassurance are sought through
CBMs:
The first is essentially continuous and related to the willing-
ness of potential adversaries to demonstrate publicly their non-
aggressive postures and generally defensive concerns by opening
their internal affairs to examination. . . . The second is
designed to operate primarily in times of crisis. As a result
of measures agreed between the parties, both should know that
they are less vulnerable to the danggrs of a surprise attack
because they are assured of warning. -5
Alford goes on to categorize CBMs as being either subjective or objec-
tive. Both types seek to shape perceptions concerning an adversary's
intentions; however, a subjective CBM (e.g., exchanging observers), per
se, does not restrain activity, whereas objective CBMs (i.e., those
which "place physical limits on what each side can do in peacetime") aim
4
at codifying good intentions through actual constraints.
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Although CSCE's Final Act of 1975 was limited to ground forces, Hel-
sinki's confidence-building approach could be applied in analogous ways
to naval forces. Richard Haass, of the Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, sees three areas for such an
approach:
. . .
the establishment of procedures or 'rules of the road'
to lessen the chance of accidental conflict and reduce oppor-
tunities for intimidation and harassment of an adversary's
vessels; the requirement that prior notification be provided
for designated naval activities (inventory changes, transits,
or deployments in a given area, port calls, exercises, etc.)
such as the notices that are given before certain ground
maneuvers under the CSCE (Helsinki) Final Act; and, if CBMs
are defined in their broadest sense, the introduction of
actual constraints on the use of naval or sea-based forces,
in which case they become tantamount to activity controls.
This chapter will examine two types of CBMs. The first type, deploy-
ment restrictions on naval forces, falls into Haass' "broadest sense" and
Alford's "objective" categories. The second type, naval inventory con-
trols, limits either the quantity or the characteristics of hardware that
may be constructed. All of these CBMs address some aspect of possible
SSBN vulnerability. The proposals either aim at ensuring that trends in
strategic ASW capabilities do not eventuate in either side being able to
conclude that a pre-emptive strike against its own or its adversary's
SSBNs is possible, or they attempt to insulate SSBNs from unintended
attrition that could lead to an inadvertent escalation of hostilities at
some point on the spectrum of conflict from crisis through general nuclear
6
war.
Attempts at controlling the size and deployment of naval forces are
not new. Some agreements have regulated the types and quantities of
ships that nations have been allowed to construct (e.g., the Washington
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and London Naval Treaties of 1922 and 1930) , while others have limited the
deployment of naval forces in key areas (e.g., both the Rush-Bagot Treaty
of 1817 for the Great Lakes and the Montreux Convention of 1936 for the
7
Black Sea are still in force) . Deployment controls can be abrogated
quickly, while the effects of inventory restrictions would take some time
to reverse, insofar as the lead time of ship construction programs is con-
siderable. Abrogating either type of agreement could be an escalatory step
that might provoke an undesirable response. The SSBN survivability CBMs
that will be dealt with in this chapter are listed in Table III, which
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The proposals listed in Table III have been discussed in the litera-
ture since the early 70s, so none of them qualifies as a new idea; none-
theless, some of them may be introduced in the strategic arms limitation
negotiations now underway in Geneva. Past commentary on these measures
has generally started with the assumption that both sides adhere to a
o
strategic doctrine based on mutual assured destruction. Since U.S.
strategic doctrine and force capabilities continued to evolve during and
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after the SALT II negotiations (discussed in Chapters II and III), another
look at these proposals seems worthwhile. Even though this evaluation
will evince the American perspective, the U.S.'s outlook is necessarily
conditioned by a calculation of the impact that these CBMs would have
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. These CBMs will be considered in the context
of bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR. Before turning
to the individual confidence -building measures, the approach that will be
followed in judging these proposals will be outlined.
B. EVALUATING CBMS FOR SSBN SURVIVABILITY
Three aspects of each CBM will be treated. First, the proposal itself
will be described. The specific threat to SSBN survivability that the
CBM addresses will be considered, and the details of how the measure might
work in practice will be suggested, highlighting any complexities inherent
in a given type of CBM. Second, the negotiability of each CBM will be
assessed. Three questions will be looked at under negotiability: a)
Verifiability--Can compliance with the CBM be determined in a timely
fashion, and, if not, what are the consequences?; b) Enforceability- -What
sanctions can be exacted in the event of non-compliance?; and, c) Sym-
g
metry--Does the measure require the same sacrifices from both sides?
These concerns reflect the legacy of SALT II. The relative importance of
each of these questions will vary with each CBM considered. For instance,
given the existing assymmetries between U.S. and Soviet force structure,
missions, and geography, a one-for-one correspondence in the requirements
and outcomes of some proposals may not be possible or desirable; yet,
with the Jackson amendment that followed SALT I as precedent, any pro-
posal that deals with numerical limits, (e.g., restricting the number of
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SSNs) would probably have to demonstrate symmetry to gain U.S. support.
This symmetry does not necessarily include a requirement for exact numer-
ical equality; however, any agreement that would be open to the charge of
being asymmetrical in the Soviet's favor, for whatever reasons, would have
a hard time gaining U.S. acceptance.
Finally, and most importantly, the desirability of each CBM will be
weighed. As Haass cautions:
Ultimately, however, any discussion of CBM involving naval forces
raises a fundamental question: Is it in American (or Western)
interests to have naval forces constrained? Even if naval CBM
could be negotiated, would they be desirable? Analysis prompts
caution, particularly over those naval CBM which limit flexibility
and activity.
... to constrain in naval forces in the name of building confidence
begs a key question: Confidence on whose part?-*-
Desirability, then, becomes a calculation of the costs and benefits. The
operational cost involved in a proposal, the variance that it would re-
quire from the status quo described in Chapter III, must be compensated for
by the increase in confidence and stability that would follow from entering
into such an agreement. Alford has explained two ways in which CBMs can
build confidence:
. . .
They promote confidence in one's ability to defend oneself
if threatened (that is, self-confidence) and confidence that the
other side is nor, in fact, intending to threaten (that is, mutual
confidence). There must be interaction between the two, producing
a downward spiral. . . *
A CBM must also be measured against its contribution to and consist-
ency with the overall strategic doctrine that is supports (see Chapter
II). Again, apparent divergence between strategic doctrine and a given
CBM can only be tolerated if the CBM makes an unequivocal contribution
to a state's sense of security. These calculations, intrinsically
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subjective and imprecise, are complicated even further by the need to
consider the impact that agreements may have on regional stability. As
was noted in Chapter II, the political fallout from SALT was in many ways
more significant than the numerical ceilings that were established. A
similar concern must be taken into account in gauging the desirability of
CBMs to insure that they would not give unintended signals to America's
allies.
C. CBMS
1. Establish SSBN Sanctuaries
a. The Proposal
Richard L. Garwin, of IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center,
has written frequently about the possibility of establishing sanctuaries
as a means of increasing the perceived survivability of SSBNs in their de-
terrent role. In 1972, he noted that in his opinion "such submarines are
probably adequately survivable in the absence of a new agreement," going
on to say, however, that such an agreement would "allay exaggerated fears
that our Polaris -Poseidon fleet might suddenly be neutralized by a drastic
12
advance in the effectiveness of antisubmarine warfare." The "exagger-
ated fears" cited by Garwin were presumably part of the rationale behind
the U.S.'s decision to develop Trident--a decision which had already been
made at the time that Garwin wrote. In any event, he saw SSBN sanc-
tuaries as offering both a means of reducing the feasibility of a pre-
emptive strike against the SLBM deterrent in peacetime and as a way to
avoid the unintended attrition of SSBNs during conventional war.
This proposal envisions "the creation of wide ocean sanctuaries in
which ballistic missile launching submarines of one side or another would
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be free to patrol, but which would be closed to ASW or underwater sur-
13
veillance forces of the other side." A second feature of these havens
would provide for the safe passage of SSBNs to these areas during periods
1 A
of conventional war in order to limit their attrition. Garwin comments
that such sanctuaries would have to be "large compared with the range of
ASW detection and attack devices," but not so large as to "interfere
with merchant shipping lanes or with deployment or transit routes for
15
naval vessels, including SLBMs." He also points out that the ASW forces
of other countries might present some problems, since a bilateral agree-
ment between the U.S. and USSR could not exclude such forces from sanct-
uaries established in international waters. In addition to the ASW
forces of other countries, the sanctuary picture is muddied further by
the fact that both France and England operate SSBNs. Working out these
details, and others, would be a difficult problem for anyone actually
tasked with negotiating such an agreement. Some of the obstacles to con-
cluding a sanctuary arrangement are considered below.
b. Negotiability
Even the most obvious questions concerning SSBN sanctuaries
suggest that they would be difficult to negotiate. For instance, would
sanctuaries be established in both the Pacific and Atlantic, and, if so,
would their distance from an adversary's shore be a function of the
range of the least caDable SLBM in the sanctuary owner's inventory?
Would the prohibition against ASW surveillance require the U.S. to dis-
mantle portions of the SOSUS network? Would sanctuaries established in
international waters have to be reconciled with or sanctioned by the
emerging Law of the Sea? The sanctuary sizing and location problem will
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be touched on in connection with the proposal to ban the testing of
plunging RVs, which addresses the "vulnerability of SSBNs to a barrage
attack by ballistic missiles if they are known to be in an ocean area of
a given dimension. Apart from these inherent problems, what can be said
about the questions of verifiability, enforceability, and symmetry of
SSBN sanctuaries?
Brian McCue has commented that the "verifiability of the sanctuary
would depend upon how much the owner was willing to spend on patrolling
it with aircraft and other ASW assets of his own. For once, that which is
to be verified would be readily accessible to the verifier. . ." Ease
of verification would depend upon where the sanctuaries were located.
For example , if the sanctuaries were placed in open ocean areas , it
seems clear that the Soviet Union's ASW capabilities (see Chapter III)
would not permit the VMF anything approaching certainty in detecting
sanctuary violations. However, since the open ocean far from each super-
power's coastline is the least likely area to be selected for SSBN sanc-
tuaries (discussed below), McCue's verifiability assessment is accurate.
In considering how a sanctuary agreement might be enforced it seems
reasonable to differentiate between enforcement in peacetime and during
conventional war. Peacetime complaints about alleged violations of SSBN
sanctuaries would likely be referred to SALT'S Standing Consultative
Committee (SCC) , or a similar body, for review and disposition. Proving
a violation in such a forum would be a difficult proposition in the face
of a flat denial by the accused that any violation took place. As to
sanctions, repeated violations would probably lead to the treaty's ab-
rogation. In any case, this deliberative approach to handling violations
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would certainly be preferable to any scheme giving a sanctuary owner the
right to conduct attacks on unidentified submarine contacts, especially
if the sanctuary is not recognized on a multilateral basis.
During a conventional war, a different approach would be taken. The
safe passage of SLBMs to their sanctuaries has already been mentioned.
Garwin has explained that such a provision would require ASW forces en-
gaged in tactical operations to distinguish SSBNs from attack submarines.
He suggests that this problem could be resolved by having the SSBN proceed
on the surface or tow a buoy while submerged that emitted a special signal
identifying the submarine as an SSBN enroute to its sanctuary (ASW forces
17
could request the submerged SSBN to surface for positive identification)
.
The scenario that Garwin had in mind in 1972 probably saw Soviet Yankees
being allowed to transit the GIUK gap during a period of conventional war.
This scenario has been overtaken by events: given the advent of the
Deltas and their longer range SLBMs, it doesn't seem likely that a sanc-
tuary beyond the GIUK gap would be desired by the Soviet Union, much less
acceptable to the U.S. However, even in the context of a sanctuary very
near to a nation's SSBN bases, some provision for SSBN passage might
have to be made if avoiding the unintended attrition of SSBNs were con-
sidered to be desirable- -compliance with a safe passage provision would
turn on each side's fear of escalation and reprisals in kind for any sink-
ing of an SSBN. As to ASW forces penetrating an adversary's sanctuary
during conventional war, the agreement creating the sanctuaries could pro-
vide for a shift from the peacetime SCC regime for redressing sanctuary
violations. Even without such a provision, all attack submarines would
be fair game if there were a conventional war going on in Europe. SSBN
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sanctuaries would be more heavily defended during any war, and neutral ASW
forces (especially SS/SSNs),'if any remained, could only insure their sur-
vival by remaining clear of such areas.
Can an SSBN sanctuary proposal meet the test of symmetry? McCue ex-
concluded that the "symmetry criterion is impossible to meet, because
there are no two pieces of identical geography anywhere in the world," ob-
serving that the parties would have to accept that their sanctuaries were
18
"essentially equivalent." Nonetheless, locating and sizing the sanc-
tuaries to give the appearance of symmetry or "essential equivalence"
does not seem to be the primary stumbling block that would stand in the
way of reaching such an agreement. Rather, there are some basic strategic
and operational asymmetries, discussed below, that may make any sanctuary
less than desirable from the U.S.'s perspective,
c. Desirability
Although the complexity inherent in negotiating bilateral
SSBN sanctuaries (outlined above) could make achieving such an arrangement
problematic, complexity is not a sufficient cause for rejecting such a
proposal out of hand, even though the negotiating environment described
in Chapter II is already overtaxed. Indeed, complicated agreements have
been reached before, and if both superpowers found it in their interest to
conclude a sanctuary agreement, technical complexity would not stand in
the way. In any case, the effect that such an agreement would have on
U.S. security interests must be the overarching criterion in deciding





At the most basic level, the threat that SSBN sanctuaries are purported
to solve is not an urgent one for the U.S. Navy. American SSBNs are not
perceived as being vulnerable to the Soviet Union's ASW forces for all the
reasons described in Chapter III, The U.S. has added to this sense of
invulnerability over the years by developing SLBMs of increased range,
which have allowed SSBNs greater flexibility in the choice of ocean areas
for their deterrent patrols. Agreeing to limit SSBNs to designated sanc-
tuaries would involve a dramatic shift in U.S. SSBN employment practices--
a shift whose effect might well be to diminish, rather than increase,
American confidence in the survivability of its SLBM force.
In contrast, such an arrangement would be consistent with Soviet peace-
time SSBN employment practices, as well as with the VMF's wartime with-
holding strategy. A bilateral sanctuary agreement would amount to de jure
recognition of the de facto SSBN sanctuaries that the VMF has attempted to
establish in its ASW defensive zones.
Beyond the immediate change that SSBN sanctuaries would require in
U.S. SSBN deployments, American policy-makers would have to consider the
long-term effects that adopting such a program might have on its allies.
For example, if the Soviets were given SSBN sanctuaries in the Barents
Sea on the Atlantic side and in the Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, or other
near waters on the Pacific, there could well be some impact on the regional
stability of the Nordic tier and that of the Far East. It would probably
not be a dramatic shift, but rather an incremental series of changes
whose effect might only become apparent after many years.
John Jorgen Hoist, Under-Secretary of State for Defense in Norway, has
spoken of this possibility and has gone on to relate it to the oroblem of




For example, sanctuary could be envisaged for Soviet
D-class SSBN's in the Barents Sea, and this would presumably
entail a commitment by Western ASW forces not to enter the
sanctuary zones, and, in particular, to exclude them from
their maritime surveillance envelopes. But such a change of
pattern could affect the geopolitical viability of continued
Norwegian alignment and involvement in the NATO system of
maritime surveillance. Pressures for expanding 'sanitiza-
tion' to include the littoral areas as well could increase
with expanded civilian presence in the SSBN sanctuary in
connection with oil and gas production on the continental
shelf. The sanctuary could thus become the basis for ex-
panded claims to preferential access to resources and modifi-
cation of the dividing lines on the continental shelf.
In the Pacific case, U.S. agreement to a Soviet SSBN sanctuary might well
be seen as inconsistent from the Japanese perspective, since the U.S. has
been pressing Japan for several years to increase its defense expendi-
tures in order to balance off Soviet maritime growth in the Pacific.
Beyond knowing that its own sanctuary is not being violated, each
side might also have an interest in having the other side's SSBNs patrol
in sanctuaries. This interest is not based on any concern for SSBN sur-
vivability; rather, it is driven by the desire not to have an adversary's
SSBNs in forward positions that result in improved SLBM accuracy, and
20
reduced time of flight. Of course, SSBNs not restricted to sanctuaries
could move forward. The sanctuary proposals discussed in the litera-
ture only prohibit ASW forces from entering such areas: they do not say
that SSBNs must stay in the sanctuaries. Although sanctuaries are being
considered in relation to SSBN survivability, Soviet interest in such
sanctuaries seems to have been animated primarily by a desire to keep
U.S. SSBNs as far as possible from Soviet shores in order to lessen the
potential for a surprise attack.
The Soviets have made a number of proposals over the years relating
to naval arms control. In 1974, for instance, Brezhnev called for the
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withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean.
Calhoun and Petersen note that implementing this proposal "would achieve
a long-standing goal of the Soviet political leadership and the Navy--
pushing the seaborne threat to the USSR further from Soviet shores.""
They also point out that past Soviet naval arms limitation proposals
have been timed to influence ongoing SALT negotiations (especially in
22
connection with the forward-based systems issue) . Brezhnev recently
made another naval arms limitation proposal that is consistent with this
pattern (i.e., timed to influence START). His proposal and the White
House response summarize the opening positions of both sides on SSBN
sanctuaries.
In an address that Brezhnev gave to the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade
Unions on 16 March 1982, he stated:
... We would be prepared, for example, to agree to a mutual limit
on operations of naval fleets. In peacetime, we would consider it
possible to agree that the missile submarines of the two sides should
be removed from their present extensive combat patrol areas and that
their cruises should be restricted by limits mutually agreed upon.
We would also be prepared to discuss the matter of spreading confidence
-
building measures to the seas and oceans. ... In short, we are in
favor of the greatest possible area of the world's oceans becoming a
zone of peace in the nearest future.
A statement issued by the White House rejected Brezhnev's offer:
President Brezhnev's proposal to place limits on the operations
of missile submarines is also not a serious proposal. . . . Re-
ducing their area of operations in the world's oceans would
increase their vulnerability and erode our confidence in their
deterrent capability. The Soviet proposal, therefore, is entire-
ly self-serving. Having made a large fraction of our land-based
ICBM force vulnerable through their large ICBM build-up, the
Soviets in this proposal are attempting to reduce the confidence
we have in the sea-based leg of our deterrent.
In short, as the present U.S. administration sees it, Haass' key questions
on CBMs-- "Confidence on whose part?"--can be answered relative to the SSBN
sanctuaries proposal: Notthe U.S.'s.
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The White House response reflects the fact that the U.S. enjoys an
ASW advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, if the USSR were
to press for SSBN sanctuaries, Washington could define such a proposal
as being a U.S. concession that would require an offsetting tradeoff
by the Soviet Union in some other area of U.S. concern (e.g., reduc-
ing the Soviet ICBM threat in line with the longstanding U.S. goal of
"driving the Soviets to sea") . One such concessionary proposal that the
U.S. might find possible to entertain if the Soviets offered a signifi-
cant quid pro quo is outlined below.
As noted, the sanctuary proposals discussed in the literature only
require that ASW forces stay out of the designated havens: they do not
restrict SSBNs to patrolling in the sanctuaries, but only say that if
SSBNs choose to patrol in these areas they will not be monitored by ASW
forces. So, although the Soviet interest in sanctuaries may be so close-
ly intertwined as to be inseparable from Moscow's desire to keep U.S.
SSBNs as far away from the Soviet Union as possible, the U.S. would not
agree to any arrangement that restricted U.S. SSBNs to patrol in des-
ignated sanctuaries for all the reasons stated in the White House reply
to Brezhnev's offer.
If the Soviets were still interested in SSBN sanctuaries with restric-
tions on U.S. SSBNs defined as non-negotiable, then the U.S. might con-
sider agreeing to half a sanctuary. It is termed half a sanctuary because
the U.S. perception of SSBN survivability would not be heightened by a
sanctuary agreement. Under such a proposal the U.S. would agree to keep
its ASW forces out of certain ocean areas whose locations are suggested
below. Similar sanctuaries could also be set up on the U.S. coasts in
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the interest of symmetry, but it would be explicitly stated that the U.S.
would not restrict its SSBNs to those locations.
Where might the U.S. find it acceptable to restrict its ASW forces
from routine peacetime operations? It could not be in an area that over-
lapped with tactical U.S. ASW missions (e.g., the Barents Sea). The
Kara Sea might be one possible location for a Soviet SSBN sanctuary. The
eastern end of the Barents Sea is marked by the island of Novaya Zemlya:
the Kara Sea lies to the east of this island. Because Soviet SSBNs leav-
ing Murmansk would have to transit the Barents Sea, which would not be
off limits to U.S. ASW surveillance, a safe passage arrangement would re-
quire Soviet SSBNs to proceed on the surface along designated coastal
routes until they arrived at their sanctuary. As to the Pacific coast, a
similar arrangement might be possible in the northern half of the Seas
of Japan or Okhotsk.
Some might reasonably raise the objection that the narrowness of the
proposal outlined above would not prompt the Soviets to offer much to
reach such an agreement, especially since the VMF may feel relatively
confident that it can already defend the proposed areas from U.S. ASW
forces. For instance, ice conditions in the Kara Sea make it only
"occasionally penetrable by powerful icebreakers" eight months out of
25
the year. As Caldwell noted (cited above) , the Derformance of acoustic
systems is degraded under the ice. Whether or not these same ice condi-
tions would be an obstacle to a Soviet SLBM launch from the Kara Sea is
another question. In any case, Soviet ASW capabilities are clearly
more threatening in these close-in areas than they are in the open sea.
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Finally, even if the Soviets were interested in such a limited pro-
posal, the tradeoff that they would have to offer in return would have to
be a significant one to overcome strong U.S. resistance to placing any
restrictions on ASW forces.
2. Ban the Testing of Plunging RVs
a. The Proposal
A ballistic missile (ICBM/MRBM/SLBM) equipped with plunging
re-entry vehicles has the potential to be an effective ASW weapon. Be-
cause the lethality of nuclear weapons is so much greater than that of
conventional weapons, a greater margin of error in localizing a target sub-
marine is acceptable, if it is going to be attacked with a nuclear weapon.
Indeed, both the U.S. and Soviet Navies already have nuclear capable ASW
weapons (e.g., the U.S. SUBROC and the Soviet SS-N-15) that are designed
to take advantage of this feature in order to assure a higher probability
of kill in an ASW mission; however, these relatively short-range weapons
are delivered by platforms that have already localized their target's
position with a fair degree of accuracy. Because the payload carried by
an ICBM's re-entry vehicle (in the megaton range for Soviet RVs) is so
much greater than that of the short-range weaoons (e.g., SUBROC is about
7 ft
1 kt), w an even greater margin of error in the estimated position of a
submarine targeted with such weapons would be possible. Two different
approaches, which depend upon how well the target's position is known,
could be taken in using ballistic missiles against submarines. Before




In commenting upon the possible effects of a subsurface nuclear blast
on an SSBN, Lieutenant Commander Carl H. Clawson, Jr., U.S. Navy (retired)
has estimated that
... a nuclear weapon burst at a depth of 1,000 ft. would create
an intense shock wave traveling at about the speed of sound through
water. The lateral distance at which a one-megaton burst could
overstress and collapse a deeply submerged submarine hull is un-
known. A rough estimate would be 3-5 nautical miles, with the
aspect angle of the burst from the ship varying this distance. The
shock (water hammer) effect could be critically severe for an ex-
tended distance, damaging delicate inertical instruments and com-
ponents on both missiles and the submarine. If so, the launch
suppression requirement would have been met. A grid pattern salvo
of missiles could enlarge the interdictory damage radius and
area. '
The physics involved in an underwater blast are beyond the scope of this
discussion, but it should be noted that the depth of water, the depth at
which the blast takes place, and the depth of the target submarine are
all variables that can either magnify or reduce the shock effect. For a
nuclear warhead from a ballistic missile to yield the most effective
results in an anti-SSBN role, then, it must be specially designed to with-
stand the impact of hitting the water's surface, only detonating when it
reaches a predetermined depth--a "plunging RV." As Clawson notes, there
is sane uncertainty as to the precise effects that these weapons would
have.
Returning to the two approaches that could be taken in using ballis-
tic missiles in a ASW mission, the first of these assumes that a rough
estimate (i.e., within a 15 nm radius) of a submarine's position is
available. Roger Speed has described a theoretical scenario in which
the peacetime U.S. SSBN force at sea would be susceptible to a barrage





... if only the seventeen SSBNs are detected, it may take 150
1-MT warheads to barrage the area in which the submarines are
thought to be located. (This assumes that the SSBNs patrol at
five knots, that their initial positions are known within a
radius of 15 nm, and the warheads arrive one hour after detection.)
If there are 100 total targets (only seventeen actually being
submarines) , the Soviets will have to use about 800 warheads to
cover the area of uncertainty. They could, in theory, do this with
100 SS- 18 ICBMs and still have around 1,300 ICBMs left. 28
Since the Soviets do not know the position of U.S. SSBNs to such an
accuracy, this approach does not seem to threaten the future surviva-
bility of the U.S.'s sea-based deterrent in the absence of any break-
through in Soviet ASW capabilities. At first glance, the possibility of
the U.S. threatening the small number of Soviet SSBNs that are routinely
at sea with such an attack seems more realistic; however, this possi-
bility evaporates in the face of the retaliatory blow that it would
trigger from the Soviet's ICBM force. It is also worth noting that
since U.S. ICBM/SLBM development programs have emphasized smaller war-
heads of higher accuracy, the U.S. inventory is ill-suited for scenarios
that envision expending a lot of 1 MY warheads to destroy submarines
(only warheads on the 54 Titan II and the 450 Minutemen II have yields
in the MT range) . Such is not the case with Soviet inventory, which
exhibits a large variety of warheads in the megaton range.
The second approach to using ballistic missiles in an anti-SSBN role
involves barraging a large ocean area in which SSBNs are known to be
operating. For instance, if the superpower's SSBNs were confined to
sanctuaries, calculations would have to be made to estimate the vulner-
ability of such ocean areas to a barrage attack. Brian McCue has made
such calculations for several ocean areas. Assuming a lethal radius of
3.5 miles for a one megaton weapon, he translated this into a lethal
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area of 38 square miles for each equivalent megaton (BIT: yield to the
two-thirds power) detonated in an ocean area. He then divided the area
of possible sanctuaries by 38 to arrive at the number of EMT that would
be required to barrage them. He added 351 to each calculation to com-
pensate for both the warhead overlap that is required to cover an area
29
with circles and to allow for missile inaccuracy. (As a technical
matter, it still remains to be determined if fratricide would limit the





Sanctuary Area (Ik sq, ran.) EMT
Aral Sea 20 711
Caribbean Sea 566 20,108
Caspian Sea 115 4,086
Great Lakes 75 2,664
Gulf of Mexico 528 18,758
Hudson Bay 356 12,647
Sea of Okhotsk 439 15,596
Source
:
Brian Gerald McCue, "The Threat to the SSBN:
Unilateral and Bilateral Responses" (Master's
Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1980), p. 64.
McCue notes that "these sanctuaries do not appear to be so vulner-
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able." Indeed, projections of 1982 EMT totals that Paul Nitze brought
forth in 1979 during the congressional hearings on the SALT II Treaty




versus about 8,000 EMT in the Soviet's arsenal. Although current
figures may vary somewhat from Nitze's projections, the inescapable con-
clusion must be that barraging is not a practicable approach because it
requires far too many weapons. Even if SSBNs were concentrated in the
areas listed in Table IV, the total weaponry of either superpower would
prove inadequate to the task of barraging its adversary's SSBNs, with the
exception of the three most unlikely SSBN operating areas of the Aral
and Caspian Seas and the Great Lakes.
Given the U.S. Navy's wide ocean SSBN employment pattern and the
relative invulnerability that these boats enjoy from Soviet ASW detection,
neither of the ballistic missile attack methods cited above constitutes
an urgent threat to U.S. SSBN survivability. When placed in the context
of the overall strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviets, these
approaches do not seem particularly threatening to the Soviets either,
for all the reasons given in the earlier discussion explaining why the
Soviets feel comfortable with so many of their SSBNs in the ostensibly
vulnerable position of being in port.
Despite the fact that the plunging RV may not be high on either side's
list of threats, confidence -building deals with perceptions, and a pro-
gram for developing plunging RVs might prompt some concern. Also, the
potential for the tactical use of IREMs/ICBMs against ships at sea has
not been lost upon the Soviets. In commenting upon statements made by
the Soviet Defense Minister in 1972 to the effect that the SRF had the
capability to attack ships at sea, Norman Polmar observed that
. . . the large payloads of Soviet ICBMs permit very large
thermo -nuclear warheads with a large radius of destruction
to compensate for submarine movement during missile flight;




As noted in Chapter III, The VMF's SS-NX-13 program of the early 70s,
although never operationally deployed, was estimated to have a tactical
mission against carriers and possibly SSBNs at sea, and Clawson has sug-
gested that the 2-3 warheads on the SS-N-6 Mod 3s "could be optimized
for deployment in a submerged burst footprint more suited for sub-
marine interdiction." It also should be noted that even a warhead
not specifically designed for an optimal subsurface burst (i.e., one
that is not a plunging RV) would still create a significant underwater
shock wave if it were detonated at or near the water's surface.
The proposal to ban the testing of plunging RVs aims at assuring
each side that their SSBNs (possibly all submarines) will not have to
contend with another threat. An inferential leap is involved here: the
assumption is that plunging RVs would not be deployed without being tested.
This problem will be touched on again when the veriflability of such a
ban is considered. With the foregoing as prologue, what can be said of
the negotiability of this proposal?
b. Negotiability
Before looking at the verifiability, symmetry, and enforce-
ability of a ban on the testing of plunging RVs, it seems useful to
consider how such a proposal might find a place on the START agenda. The
U.S.'s failed attempt to conclude an agreement during SALT II to ban the
testing of SLBMs in a depressed trajectory mode may serve as a paradigm
for a test ban on plunging RVs. In September of 1978 the American dele-
gation (Warnke) caught the Soviets off guard with a proposal to ban the
testing of depressed trajectory SLBMs. The U.S. reasoned that such a
capability, if acquired, would be destabilizing because the shortened
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time of flight of these SLBMs would make them suitable for surprise at-
tacks. Strobe Talbott describes the Soviets as initially reacting to
this surprise proposal with "raised eyebrows and stiffened backs;" however,
he goes on to say that "after considerable haggling, the Soviets said they
might consider a ban on depressed trajectory missiles— if it was part of
a comprehensive treatment of the problem of sneak attack, including severe
35
limits on antisubmarine warfare (ASW)." If the issue of plunging RVs
comes up, it is apt to be linked to other proposals relating to the prob-
lem of surprise attacks (q.v., Brezhnev's March 1982 speech), just as the
earlier proposal to ban the test of depressed trajectory SLBMs was.
Would an agreement to ban the testing of plunging RVs be verifiable?
Although the monitoring of missile testing has become an institutionalized
feature of SALT (i.e., the prohibition against encrypting missile tele-
metry)
,
verifying whether or not a plunging RV had been tested would be
somewhat more challenging. McCue suggests getting around this problem
by a treaty provision that "tested RVs use a conventional explosive to
self-destruct on or before hitting the water." Such a restriction does
not appear watertight. For example, in a test involving several RVs a
plunger or two could be included without the required conventional ex-
plosive device. If monitored and challenged, the lack of an explosion
could be explained away by the offending party as a malfunction. Even
assuming that a test ban could be verified, a plunging RV seems like a
possible candidate for development without any extensive test program.
Given the experience that both sides already have with ASW weapons that
pass from air to water, detonating at predetermined depths, it seems plaus-
ible that either side might be able to develop a casing and fuze for a
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plunging RV with a reasonable degree of confidence in its operability even
without any full operational test of the RV.
As to the symmetry of a plunging RV test ban, McCue's conclusion that
it would be symmetric since it requires the same thing of both sides seems
to be a reasonable one. McCue goes on to note that the "utility of plung-
ing RVs would arguably be greater for the USSR than for the U.S., because
the USSR has more RVs and more adversary SSBNs at which to shoot them than
does the U.S." McCue's statement assumes peacetime deployment rates,
which would not necessarily apply during a crisis, and which certainly
would not apply during a conventional war. Also, since the barrage tactic
is really not a usable option for either side, an argument could be made
that because the U.S.'s ASW capabilities put it a lot closer to Speed's
scenario in which the positions of an adversary's submarines are known to
an accuracy of 15-20 NM than the Soviets are, Speed's tactic might offer
more potential for the U.S. than it does to the Soviets. Enforceability of
such a treaty would rest on the fear that its abrogation by one side would
be matched by the other, possibly contributing to a worsening of overall
relations between the two countries,
c. Desirability
Since the U.S. has not had any apparent interest in developing
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a plunging RV, an agreement to ban their testing would not appear to in-
volve any significant operational cost on the American side. So, on the
face of it such a treaty seems desirable from the U.S. perspective, since
it could eliminate a potential threat to U.S. submarines. This should not
be overstated, however, since the threat addressed by such a ban is not an
urgent one for U.S. SSBN survival, and because the ban on testing would
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only be a partial assurance that such an RV was not in the Soviet in-
ventory (a plunging RV could be developed without test or tested covertly)
.
Nonetheless, the plunging RV ban would be a worthwhile agreement, unless
its acceptance by the Soviet Union were made contingent upon other, more
restrictive proposals that the U.S. could not support.
3. Ban Active Sonar Trailing of SSBNs by SSNs
a. The Proposal
In considering whether any nation's SLBM force could become
vulnerable to "near-simultaneous destruction," Rathjens and Ruina con-
cluded in 1973 that such a development was not likely, but that the "most
worrisome possibility" for achieving such a capability was invested in the
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. nuclear attack submarine. The theoretical scenario is straightforward
enough. All of an adversary's SSBNs are located and then trailed by at-
tack submarines. These trailing SSNs are then in a position to strike pre-
emptively, either on command or at a predetermined time. Of course, trans-
lating this hypothetical scenario into an operational capability would be
difficult indeed.
The first problem relates to detecting and localizing the SSBNs so that
they could be trailed. As Rathjens and Ruina note:
. . .
ivhile trail might be initiated as a result of search and
localization of missile launching submarines in the open ocean,
the more likely possibility is to pick up the missile-launcher
as it leaves port or when it passes through narrow straits, e.g.,
the Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, the Strait Juan de
Fuca, or the entrance to Chesapeake Bay.
Solving this problem would be difficult for either superpower; however,
because of the differences in peacetime SSBN employment practices, ASW
capabilities, and geography described in Chapter III, the solution appears
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to be more distant for the Soviet Navy than it would be for the U.S. Navy.
With today's peacetime operating tempo, the VMF would have almost twice as
many SSBNs (much quieter at that) to locate than would the U.S.N. , and
this with neither the benefit of an open ocean detection system like SOSUS
or air ASW assets comparable in quantity or quality to the U.S. Navy's P-3
inventory. Establishing a trail at chokepoints is also not an even match
because of the Soviet Union's unfavorable naval geography, although this
has been mitigated somewhat by the Delta's peacetime employment pattern—
a
pattern that would require U.S. SSNs to penetrate the Soviet ASW defensive
zones if an attempt were going to be made to trail the Deltas. Since Holy
Loch, Scotland is the only remaining overseas support base for U.S. SSBNs,
and because the C-4 SLBM allows the Soviet Union to be targeted from waters
that don't require C-4 equipped SSBNs to transit restricted waters (e.g.,
the U.S. could keep C-4 equipped SSBNs outside the Mediterranean), the
opportunities for establishing a trail on U.S. ballistic missile launching
submarines as they pass chokepoints or as they begin their deterrent pa-
trols from overseas bases have narrowed markedly for the Soviets since
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Rathjens and Ruina wrote. This should not be overstated. Although it
may be a longer trip, nothing would prevent the VMF from relocating their
previous overseas effort to the coasts of the United States.
The second problem inherent in the peacetime tracking scenario would
also be a challenging one. Even if detected, could all of an adversary's
SSBNs be kept under constant trail? As Garwin wrote in 1973, "Starting
from the present, the creation of a capability for high-confidence trail-
ing of enemy ballistic missiles submarines would not be easy and might not
42
even be feasible." After dismissing passive tracking techniques as
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"doomed to failure" in any attempt to maintain a reliable, simultaneous
track on all SSBNs, Garwin posits that a high frequency sonar (i.e.,
100 KHz to 1 MHz) "Mounted on a specialized trailing vehicle (submerged,
on the surface or airborne) , . . . could provide a detailed picture of the
quarry every few seconds. The tracker could therefore sail in formation
with the quarry without fear of collision." Garwin pointed out that
no such specialized tracking vehicle was in use then (nor has one been de-
ployed since) , noting that the
. . .
chief difficulty in this type of active tracking seems to lie
not in maintaining tracking but in ensuring that a tracker is
assigned to every ballistic-missile-launching submarine
. . . Ob-
viously the other side will seek to avoid detection by employing
various strategy.
Even if the detection problem were solved, Garwin 's assessment of the
ease with which a submarine might be actively tracked seems overly opti-
mistic, and inconsistent with other things that he has written that reflect
his awareness of the difficulties involved in tracking. Just as a sub-
marine can avoid detection by the "various strategems" that Garwin refers
to, submarines also have tactics to shake an active trailer. Beyond the
problems already touched upon, command and control of a pre-emptive strike
would also put great demands on existing systems, and even if everything
else were we11-coordinated, there is no assurance that each trailing SSN
would be able to sink its assigned SSBN. However, despite the remoteness
of the continuous active trailing threat, Garwin concludes that "It would
nonetheless be valuable to reach an early agreement to eliminate fear of
this threat, which seems to have no utility other than to threaten the
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survival of the strategic deterrent."
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Before considering whether a ban on active sonar trailing would be a
desirable way to increase confidence in SSBN survivability, the negotia-
bility of such a proposal will be looked at.
b. Negotiability
Garwin argues that a ban on active trailing would be readily
verifiable since "It should not be difficult for a submarine that is being
tracked to recognize that it has (or has not) at all times a companion at
a distance of a few hundred to a few thousand meters." Certainly this is
the case, although the picture might be a little more complicated in areas
where the ASW forces of several nations might be operating. As in the
case of the sanctuary proposal , the non-superpower ASW forces would com-
plicate any bilateral agreement.
The agreement would be symmetric in the sense that it would require the
same thing of both sides, although in some sense this may not be true at
the operational level. U.S. emphasis on covertness in acoustic operations
has led to increased use of passive tracking techniques and equipment.
If it is true as some have claimed (noted above) that the BQQ-5 sonar on
the Los Angeles -class attack boats may result in the ability of U.S. SSNs
to maintain a passive track on Soviet submarines, then the U.S. might not
lose anything from an active trailing ban. Even if this passive capa-
bility is still not at the point of meeting all of Garwin' s earlier re-
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quirements for a continuous track to pre-emptively attack SSBNs , it
seems clear that U.S. SSNs on peacetime operations, especially any that
might have the tracking or identification of the VMF's SSBNs as their ob-
ject, would not be apt to give away their presence by using active sonar,
which could be likened to a car blowing its horn while in a tunnel. On
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the other hand, given the fact that Soviet passive acoustic detection
capability lags that of the U.S. coupled with the quieter submarines that
the Soviets must track, if the VMF were to attempt any tracking, it would
likely be forced to use active sonar. So, an agreement to ban active trail-
ing would not upset the U.S.'s passive acoustic programs, while Soviet SSNs
might find their capability versus U.S. SSBNs to be even more limited than
it already is if they were to agree to the ban.
As to the enforceability of a ban on active tracking, violations of
the no active trailing ban could be referred to the SCC in much the same
manner as was discussed for sanctuary violations. An alternative approach
that would require an SSBN to identify itself to the active tracker and
to request that tracking cease does not seem workable, since it is hard to
imagine an SSBN admitting its identity under any circumstances. Although
passive analysis of an SSBN's acoustic signature should permit a tracker
to confirm what type of submarine he is tracking, thus eliminating the
need for an SSBN to identify itself as an SSBN, enough real or feigned
ambiguity could exist so that a submarine commander subsequently cited with
unauthorized tracking of an SSBN could simply say that he thought he was
tracking an attack submarine. However, this ruse would have a short
half- life.
c. Desirability
Given current U.S. and Soviet ASW capabilities and SSBN em-
ployment practices, agreeing to a ban on active trailing would not, on
the face of it, involve much in the way of operational costs for either
side. From the Soviet perspective, it seems doubtful that they have
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counted themselves as being very successful in attempts at actively-
tracking U.S. SSBNs, so they would not be giving up much by agreeing to
a ban. From the U.S. perspective, since the U.S. Navy has not been ac-
cused by the Soviets of attempting to actively trail any of the VMF's
SSBNs, a ban on active SSN trailing would not seem to involve any dra-
matic shifts in current practice. But, this points to a basic problem
with the peacetime ban on active trailing of SSBNs: it attempts to build
confidence in an area that does not seem to be a source of great insecur-
ity about SSBN survivability, especially on the part of the U.S.
Because the active trailing ban does not speak to any U.S. insecurity,
it seems likely that the U.S. would not initiate such a proposal. If the
Soviets were to propose the ban, the U.S. could be expected to balk at
agreeing to it for fear that this seemingly low-cost agreement would be
a foot in the door for more restrictive bans directed at passive tracking
operations (e.g., limiting SOSUS or restricting P-3 flights).
4. Limit the Number of SSNs
a. The Proposal
A more stringent restriction than the ban on active trailing
has been proposed as a way to lessen the possible threat of a pre-
emptive strike against SSBNs, a threat which would exist if SSNs could
bring all SSBNs under simultaneous trail. Rather than relying on an
easy to abrogate treaty such as the trailing ban, some have suggested
that the inventory of SSNs could be limited to a level that would meet
a nation's needs for conventional war, but which would not be sufficient
to undertake an SSBN trailing program. As Feld and Rathjens explain:
. .
. Whether the number exists, and if so what it is, would
depend on the numbers of U.S. missile- launching submarines,
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their characteristics and those of Soviet SSKs, and the capa-
bilities of complementary and/or supporting Soviet systems.
An agreement to limit the number of missile-launching submarines
of each side up to a level less than N times the number of
missile-launching submarines on the side of an adversary would
go far toward eliminating concerns about trailing if N were less
than unity; and this might be true even if N were as large as
two or three.
Determining how many SSNs might actually be required to initiate an
all-out attempt at continuous SSBN trailing is a difficult problem.
Understandably, the answer to this question would vary widely with the
assumptions that are made in defining the problem. For instance, McCue
calculated that the U.S. would need some 455 SSNs if it wanted to be in a
position to conduct a covert, passive trail of the 75 SSBNs that he credi-
ted the YMF with at the time he made his calculations. For an active
trail, using SSNs equipped with Garwin's hypothetical, high frequency,
TY-image sonar, McCue arrived at the figure of 142 SSNs. McCue's assump-
tions for the passive figure included a requirement for three SSNs to
track each SSBN (based on a "comment from a Pentagon official") , and they
also entailed a large group (over 300) of waiting submarines, poised at
sea to intercept and trail any and all Soviet SSBNs sitting in port that
might be sortied. The substantially lower figure for the hypothetical
active trackers results largely from the fact that McCue assigns only
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one of these SSNs to each SSBN to be tracked.
McCue's figures are somewhat fanciful. Certainly if the U.S. were
to attempt a routine, covert, peacetime trailing program, it would not
keep 300 submarines at sea (even if they existed) on the odd chance that
Soviets might surge their remaining SSBNs. Also, the U.S.'s SOSUS/P-3
ASW team didn't figure into McCue's calculations. His active trailing
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figure is admittedly hypothetical, since it is based on a non-existent
tracking system. Even with a large number of SSNs dedicated to a track-
ing scheme, McCue points out that "submarines could make use of terri-
torial waters and their geography so as to escape from port without
allowing adversary submarines to acquire them and start tracking."
Program analysts could unquestionably develop a complex model of
SSBN trailing that would incorporate a wider range of variables and
assumptions than were included in McCue's relatively simple equations.
But, even if the analysts' answers were better than McCue's, it would
only be the first half of the question. The second half would involve
deciding how many submarines the U.S. Navy needs to fight a conventional
war. Again, numerous variables and assumptions would come into play.
These figures, and a similar set for the VMF, would necessarily be con-
sidered in any attempt to negotiate limits on the SSN. The range of un-
certainty inherent in such calculations would probably be large enough to
accommodate widely differing policy recommendations.
With a ratio as low as two U.S. SSNs to each Soviet SSBN, the U.S.N,
would be allowed 124 SSNs, a figure that far exceeds the current and pro-
jected U.S. SSN inventory. Conversely, the Soviets would be allowed 66
SSNs under a two to one ratio. Since the Soviet inventory includes 52
SSNs and 47 SSGNs (see Table V) , the figure of 66 would require the VMF
to reduce its inventory, because the U.S. would certainly insist that
both SSNs and SSGNs be counted. The problem of deciding on what to count
will be considered below,
b. Negotiability
A treaty limiting the number of SSNs would be fairly easy to
verify, since it is difficult to mask shipbuilding programs for very
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long. Some cheating on the margin might be possible, but a rapid break-
out, in which one side makes substantial gains on the other, would not
be feasible. This is especially true on the U.S. side, where the Con-
gressional debate surrounding the budget process would keep the Soviets
well-informed of U.S. building programs. If entered into, an agreement
limiting SSNs would continue in force as long as both sides calculated
that it was in their interest to comply with the restrictions. Presuma-
bly, if one side were to abrogate the treaty by exceeding the SSN limits,
the other would respond in kind.
The primary obstacle to reaching an agreement to limit SSNs is the
asymmetrical makeup of the existing Soviet and U.S. submarine fleets,
which is summarized in Table V. The VMF's large inventory of nuclear
and conventional cruise missile launching submarines, as well as its
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numerous diesel attack boats, is not matched by the U.S. Navy.
TABLE V




















Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1981-1982, pp . 7 5 12
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McCue suggested getting around the symmetry problem by limiting the
number of SSNs that either side could have to one-half of the number of
SSBNs that its rival had. He proposed that this agreement be implemented
slowly with a fifteen-year grace period for both sides to come into compli-
ance (primarily through the attrition, without replacement, of older
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SSNs) . The draft that McCue wrote for his SSN proposal defined an SSN
as "any submersible vessel, powered by the fission or fusion of elements,
which is capable of destroying another vessel of its own kind through
the use of undersea torpedoes or any other weapon whatsoever, and which
is not an SSBN, is an SSN."
Despite his definition, McCue does not count the VMF's SSGNs in a
table that he uses to show the current SSBN/SSN force levels --levels that
would be the starting point for any SSN reductions under McCue 's plan.
The omission of the SSGNs is hard to understand, since they all carry tor-
pedoes that could be used against SSBNs, unless they are not counted be-
cause of speed considerations. For example, U.S. SSBNs enjoy a two-knot
speed advantage on the twenty- three knot, E-II SSGNs, which means that a
U.S. SSBN could gradually outrun a trailing E-II. However, the seventeen
Charlie -class SSGNs would not suffer this speed disadvantage in trailing
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a twenty-five knot SSBN. Whether or not the high level of self-noise
that the Charlies would generate at such speeds would leave their sonars
capable of a trailing task is another question. The SSGN issue is only
mentioned to demonstrate that the asymmetries apparent in Table V , which
are the results of the different roles and missions assigned to the U.S.




Leaving aside the question of who would initiate such a proposal, if
SSN limits did manage to get on the already crowded START/INF agenda, it
seems unlikely that any ambitious reductions would be negotiated in the
first round of such talks. As was noted in Chapter II, many have faulted
SALT for establishing limits that were so high as to be meaningless be-
cause they allowed each side to continue with its existing modernization
programs. If SSN talks did not break off in a standoff over what in
Table V was going to be counted, the most reasonable expectation would be
that a short-term protocol codifying existing SSN levels and programs
might be concluded, with a provision for talking about SSNs again in future
negotiations. Given the inherent complexity in negotiating such an agree-
ment, would it be desirable for the U.S. to make the attempt?
c. Desirability
Making the size of the U.S. Navy's SSN force a function of
Soviet SSBN levels could be interpreted as an explicit admission that U.S.
attack submarines have been developed primarily for an anti-SSBN mission.
As Chapter II 's discussion of strategic ASW (i.e., anti-SSBN) noted, the
U.S.N, has been reluctant to differentiate among the various types of
Soviet submarines in defining the mission of its own attack boats, prefer-
ring instead a wartime mission structure that sees all Soviet submarines
as fair game.
In a 1971 Brookings staff paper on naval force requirements, Arnold M.
Kuzmack stated that the U.S. maintains
. . .
ASW forces to protect merchant ships carrying logistic
support for our forces overseas and economic support for our
allies and to protect other naval forces from attack by enemy
submarines. (The possible mission of protecting the United
States against submarine-launched ballistic missiles is in-
tentionally omitted, since the ability of ASW forces to sink
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significant numbers of ballistic-missile submarines before
they can launch their missiles appears to be nil.)
Kuzmack' s pessimistic assessment of U.S. ASW capabilities against
Soviet SSBNs may have been predicated on a scenario in which Soviet SLBMs
are launched as part of a surprise attack against the U.S. However, the
CBM to limit SSNs is addressed to the threat to SSBN survivability in-
volved in a scenario in which either side makes an attempt to pre-empt
the other's SLBM force using trailing SSNs. Although U.S. ASW capabili-
ties would certainly give odds higher than nil in such an attempt, the
scenario itself is unlikely given the present strategic balance (correla-
tion of forces)
.
Irrespective of the U.S.'s stance on strategic ASW, the two broad
missions outlined by Kuzmack in 1971 continue to provide the underlying
rationale for the U.S. Navy's attack submarine program. For instance, the
ASW barrier across the GIUK gap, which is intended to ensure that the re-
supply of Europe can take place during a NATO vs. Warsaw Pact conflict,
would have to include a substantial number of SSNs to be effective. The
second mission mentioned by Kuzmack, defense of naval forces, is at its
most demanding level when placed in the context of defending a carrier
battle group against the threat of a cruise missile attack launched by
Soviet SSGNs. U.S. SSNs have been designed to meet these missions. As
was mentioned earlier, the development of the Los Angeles-class attack
boats was prompted by the threat embodied in the VMF's Charlie (SSGN) and
Victor (SSN) submarines. Further, the concept of submarines acting in
direct support of surface ships has been given increased emphasis in the
U.S. Navy, as a complementary tactic to the indirect tactical ASW
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support provided to surface ships by distant ASW barrier operations that
attempt to counter an adversary's submarines as close to their source as
is possible.
When the missions just discussed are juxtaposed with the submarine
assets that the U.S. Navy has available, many might conclude that more,
not fewer, SSNs would be required by the U.S. Navy if it is to be capable
of fulfilling its warfighting missions, independent of any anti-SSBN goal.
The aggregate numbers tallied in Table V would militate strongly against
any proposal to limit SSNs, unless it was an "unequal agreement" that re-
quired far greater reductions of the Soviet submarine fleet than it did
of the U.S. fleet. Such an agreement probably would not be acceptable
to the Soviets. Finally, the trailing threat that the SSN CBM is intended
to lessen is not one that the U.S. perceives as being a serious one.
Restricting SSNs in the name of building confidence in submarine surviva-
bility does not answer any U.S. security needs, and it has the potential,
depending on the numbers involved, to exacerbate the tactical ASW prob-
lems of defending other U.S. naval ships from the submarine threat and
ensuring that SLOCs can be maintained.
5. Prohibit the Deployment of Large, Fixed, Active Sonars
a. The Proposal
If either superpower were able to conduct a near-simultaneous
search of its adversary's likely submarine operating areas, the implica-
tions for SSBN survivability would be very serious. To be truly menacing,
this capability would have to combine a very high probability of detec-
tion with the ability to classify and localize submarines to a very-
narrow range of uncertainty. Even with such a system in place, a method
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of coordinating weapons delivery, possibly using a combination of the ASW
weapons discussed in earlier sections, would have to be added to the de-
tection system if it were to be used in an attempt to pre-emptively strike
SSBNs.
Although an accurate area search system like the one outlined above
does not exist now, Feld and Rathjens suggested in 1973 that "limitations
on the deployment of large, fixed, active sonar arrays" might be a desir-
able confidence-building measure that could demonstrate that neither side
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was attempting to gain the capability to pre-empt the other's SLBM force.
Garwin noted in 1973 that:
Extensive experiments have been conducted over the last decade
of fixed-active sonar systems, in which a sonar signal is gener-
ated in the few hundred hertz range, at multi-megawatt power
levels, and with good angular definition, in order to attempt to
detect submarines at ranges of hundreds of kilometers. First of
all such installations are expensive. In addition, active sonar
in general broadcasts its location, raising a question of physical
vulnerability of the sonar system. Furthermore, a fixed active
sonar provides the opposition with an example of the pulse whose
echo the sonar is designed to receive, thereby in some ways easing
very substantially the job of the opposition in spoofing or
jamming the sonar system.
Feld and Rathjens admit that the "difficulties in practice would be
enormous" in developing such systems, but they go on to say that this
very real technical problem "is less relevant than the possibility that
their deployment would arouse fears about the viability of the submarine
which might involve an escalation in the strategic arms race." In
other words, even ineffectual systems are seen by Feld and Rathjens as
having the potential to prompt fears about SSBN survivability.
Since neither side has deployed any large, fixed, active sonars,
could an agreement not to deploy them be a low-cost way of building
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confidence? The negotiability and desirability of such a proposal are
considered below.
b. Negotiability
Verifying compliance with an agreement banning large, fixed
active sonars would not present a problem. First, since the task of
putting such equipment in place would be a large-scale effort, it is doubt-
ful that it could be done covertly. Second, since it would be an active
system that would literally insonify the oceans, its use would be obvious.
As with other of the CEMs that have been considered, enforcing such an
agreement would rest on mutual restraint and the ability of the side that
detected cheating to respond with a similar system or other
countermeasures
.
The ban on fixed, large, active sonars would be symmetrical, insofar
as it would require the same thing of both sides: eschewing a system that
has yet to be developed, in the same way that the U.S. and USSR foreswore
full-scale deployment of ABMs in the ABM Treaty. It is worth noting that
the practicality of such a fixed system is much less for the Soviet Union
than it would be for the United States because Soviet geography does not
offer as many potentially usable locations to site such sonars. There are
other asymmetries that would make such an agreement undesirable from the
U.S. perspective.
c. Desirability
On the face of it, the operational cost of agreeing to a ban
on deploying large, fixed, active sonars would seem to be a minimal one
for the United States. As earlier sections have pointed out, the U.S.N.'s
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ASW program has increasingly emphasized passive detection techniques. The
SOSUS network is a prime example of this emphasis, and the existence of
this system probably means that the U.S. might be reluctant to discuss a
ban on fixed, active sonars.
Since the U.S. does not have any apparent plans to deploy a fixed,
active system, any attempt by the Soviets to discuss a ban on such sonars
would be viewed by the U.S. as a stalking-horse for restrictions on other
ASW sensors. If the U.S. were to agree to a ban on the fixed active sys-
tem because they were perceived as being potentially destabilizing, it
could set a precedent for discussions of analogous restrictions on passive
fixed systems (SOSUS) , and possibly mobile ASW systems (SURTASS/RDSS)
.
As Wit has explained:
The ability to monitor Russian missile-carrying submarines could
therefore be considered stabilizing in that it deters surprise
attack and enhances the survivability of U.S. strategic forces.
Nevertheless, in pursuing these legitimate objectives the U.S.
could acquire a capability that could be perceived as threatening
the survivability of Russian ballistic-missile
fi
submarines and
therefore could be construed as destabilizing.
Feld and Rathjens' suggestion (cited above) that the technical problems
in deploying fixed, active sonars may be less important than the possible
fears that these systems could give rise to seems to ignore the face that
the VMF already has such fears, since it has been confronted with the
U.S. Navy's improving SOSUS network for many years. While this system
does not approach the accuracy of the hypothetical active sonars under dis-
cussion (see Chapter III) , its detection capability is probably one of
the reasons that explain the defended sanctuary approach to SSBN opera-
tions that the Soviet Union has adopted. In a real sense, the VMF has
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already taken unilateral actions to offset the threat that a bilateral
agreement to ban large, fixed, active sonars is aimed at.
Because the fixed sonars ban does not address any immediate threat to
either the U.S. or Soviet Navies, and since agreeing to such a ban could
serve as a precedent (the foot in the door) for attempts to restrict
U.S. systems that are important to tactical ASW (e.g., SOSUS, RDSS, etc.),
the United States might be reluctant to even talk about, much less agree
to, such a ban. The Soviet Union, however, might find the proposal very
attractive for the same reasons.
122

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TV
Johan Jorgen Hoist and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and
Confidence-Building Measures/' Survival , July/August 1977, p. 147
cited by Abbott A. Brayton, "Confidence -Building Measures in European
Security," The World Today , October 1980, p. 382.
2
""Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Se-
curity and Disarmament, Included in the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe," reproduced in SIPRI, Arms Control :
A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements (London: Taylor and
Francis Ltd., 1978), p. 121.
Jonathan Alford, "Confidence -Building Measures in Europe: The Military
Aspects," in "The Future of Arms Control: Part III," Adelphi Papers
Number 149, ed. Jonathan Alford (London: The International Institute for





Richard Haass, "Arms Control and the Indian Ocean" in Arms Control and
Defense Postures in the 1980s
,
ed. Richard Burt (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1982), p. 146.
There is another group of SSBN-related CBMs directed at ensuring that
SSBNs are perceived as being second-strike weapons (e.g., not testing
SLBMs in a depressed trajectory because it would reduce SLBM time of
flight and strategic warning) . Such CBMs will not be considered here
except when they intersect with the ASW-related CBMs being examined.
7
Barry M. Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1975)
,
provides an highly readable survey




Brian Gerald McCue, "The Threat to the SSBN: Unilateral and Bilateral
Responses" (Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1980)
,
proved to be a valuable source for the technical aspects of these
proposals, but even though it was written in 1980, its starting assump-
tions are predicated on MAD.
9
The framework selected here for looking at CBMs was suggested by
McCue's thesis and by the FY 85 Arms Control Impact Statements . McCue
identified five criteria that he felt were important aspects for
evaluating treaties: 1) symmetry; 2) verifiability; 3) enforceability;
4) acceptable effect on non-signatores; and 5) satisfying domestic
public opinion. Among the seven factors that the FY 83 Arms Control
123

Impact Statements examined in analyzing the probably impact of U.S.
weapons systems on arms control issues, four proved useful in consider-
ing the SSBN CBMs: 1) consistency with U.S. arms control policy and
related presidential decisions; 2) effect on global and regional
stability; 3) technological implications of new weapons; and 4)
verification.
Richard Haass, "Confidence -Building Measures and Naval Arms Control,"
in Adelphi Papers Number 149, p. 28.
Alford, p. 3.
12
Richard L. Garwin, "Antisubmarine Warfare and National Security,"
Scientific American
,
July 1972, p. 259.
13
Richard L. Garwin, "The Interaction of Antisubmarine Warfare with the
Submarine -Based Deterrent," in The Future of the Sea-based Deterrent
,
ed. Kosta Tsipis, Anne H. Cahn, and Bernard T. Feld (Cambridge: The







" Garwin, "The Interaction of Anti-submarine Warfare with the Submarine-,
based Deterrent," pp. 117-119.
McCue, p. 75.
19
Johan Jorgen Hoist, "Prospects for Conflict Management and Arms Control




Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1979), p. 98, for instance, suggests limiting SSBN
patrol areas as a means of compensating for the susceptibility of
bombers to a surprise SLBM attack.
21
Anne Kelly Calhoun and Charles Petersen, "Changes in Soviet Naval
Policy: Prospects for Arms Limitations in the Mediterranean and Indian
Ocean," in Naval Power in Soviet Policy , ed. by Paul J. Murphy (Washing-











U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Ice Atlas of the Northern Hemisphere
(Washington, D.C.: U.S.N. Hydrographic Office, 1946), passim.
26
Ronald Pretty, ed. , Jane's Weapons Systems 1981-1982 , 12th ed. (New
York: Jane's Publishing Co., 1981), p. 143.
27
Lieutenant Commander Carl H. Clawson, Jr., U.S. Navy (retired), "The
Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs- -Round Two," U.S. Naval Institute Proceed -










U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The SALT II
Treaty Part 1
,
96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 467-469.
33
Norman Polmar, "Thinking About Soviet ASW," U.S. Naval Institute Proceed -
ings , May 1976, p. 126 cited by Grant Joseph Caughery "Naval Implications
of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks" (Master's thesis, Naval Post-
graduate School, 1980), p. 23.
Clawson, p. 68.
35





Jane's Weapons Systems 1981-1982
,
p. 11 gives a concise review of U.S.
RV programs , none of which demonstrate any interest in plunging RVs.
39







For instance, it is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet AGIs (in-
telligence gathering ships) that used to loiter outside SSBN support
bases, such as the one formerly located in Guam, could have played a
role in helping the VMF to establish a track on U.S. SSBNs.
125

Garwin, "The Interaction of Antisubmarine Warfare with the Submarine-
Based Deterrent," p. 98. Garwin 1 s pessimism on passive tracking of
SSBNs in an attempt to gain a capability to pre-empt is a question of
numbers and weapons. He says that a passive approach to maintaining a
"reliable track against routine evasive measures of the enemy sub-
marine and in the face of normal sound velocity variations and sea
noise would seem to require at least several tracking submarines for
each quarry," going on to say that a kill at the longer ranges used
in passive tracking might require a faster torpedo, explaining else-
where that torpedoes fired at a long distance could give an SSBN the
chance to fire its SLBMs.
43





Ibid., p. 257. Garwin argues that while tracking exercises are useful
for training during tactical ASW exercises, such tracking would not
play a part in wartime conditions, when submarines would presumably




Richard L. Garwin, "ASW and the Future Navy," A paper for the Colloquium
on Science and Disarmament Institut Francais des Relations Internation-
ales, January 15, 1981, p. 12 still reflects Garwin ' s pessimism with
regard to passive tracking systems saying that "it is far less likely





B. T. Feld and G. W. Rathjens, "ASW, Arms Control and the Sea-Based
Deterrent," in The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent
,
p. 134. An SSK





For the U.S., such a response would be contingent on the domestic
political process with all that it entails.
52
IISS, The Military Balance 1981-1982
, pp. 7 and 12.
The U.S.N, has added Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles (tube- launched)
to the weapons loadout of its SSNs, and the Tomahawk cruise missile









Jean Labayle Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World 1982/1983 (AnnaDolis:
United States Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 606-607; 720-721
provide speeds for cited submarines.
58
Arnold M. Kuzmack, Naval Force Levels and Modernization (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 32-33.
59
Feld and Rathjens, p. 135.
Garwin, "The Interaction of Ant i- Submarine Warfare with the Submarine
-
Based Deterrent," p. 97.
Feld and Rathjens, p. 135.
Joel S. Wit, "Advances in Antisubmarine Warfare," Scientific American
,




What, then, are the prospects for SSBN survivability confidence-
building measures? Before turning to the five CBMs, two general ob-
servations that affect the U.S. outlook on all of these proposals
should be reiterated.
First, as Chapter II explained, America's declaratory strategic
doctrine no longer turns on the MAD formulation. U.S. planners are
still committed to the deterrence goal; however, the creation of a more
credible warfighting capability now seems to be in the ascendancy as the
preferred means of assuring deterrence. In this regard, it could be ar-
gued that U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrines are based on assumptions
about deterrence that are more similar now than they ever were during the
SALT years. How does this affect the SSBN CBMs?
While the superpowers necessarily have a shared interest in managing
the strategic competition and in avoiding nuclear war, deterrence based
on warfighting capabilities would seem to rely more on unilateral actions
to solve national security problems than it does on seeking solutions
through negotiations. Bilateral agreements will still play an important
role; however, in contrast to the SALT process, U.S. negotiations will be
more concerned with maintaining the perception in Soviet eyes of a cred-
ible U.S. warfighting capability, than they will be with any attempt to
maneuver Moscow into accepting U.S. strategic formulations.
The U.S. shift to a warfighting-based deterrence, which is neither
complete nor accepted by all, has important implications for SSBN CBMs.
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For instance, whereas a strategic ASW capability or a counterforce capable
SLBM are inconsistent with MAD, both of these can be reconciled with a
doctrine organized about warfighting deterrence, and both could be in-
terpreted as being responsive to PD-59's emphasis on flexibility.
This notwithstanding, each superpower still has a selfish interest
in the other's peace of mind- -crisis stability is a desirable feature of
the strategic environment. Weapons programs and force deployment prac-
tices that are unnecessarily provocative should be avoided. Thus, CBMs
may still have a possible role to play, but they will not find accept-
ance if they constrain U.S. capabilities or options without noticeably in-
creasing stability.
Chapter Ill's review of SSBN capabilities and vulnerabilities led to
a second general observation: the U.S. Navy's ballistic missile launching
submarines are relatively invulnerable to Soviet ASW forces. As a result,
CBMs that aim at increasing the perception of SSBN survivability are not
seen as an urgent concern from the U.S. perspective. These measures
attempt to solve a problem that is largely non-existent for America's
SSBN fleet. The U.S. triad has come to rest more heavily on its sea-based
leg because of ICBM vulnerability: there is thus a natural skepticism
concerning any measure that might affect current U.S. SSBN employment
patterns, even if the effect were only a tangential one. As was noted,
U.S. SSBNs carry one-half of America's strategic nuclear warheads, while
the Soviet Navy has less than one-quarter of the USSR's warheads. There-
fore, the U.S. is naturally more sensitive than the Soviet Union may be
to the possible effects that agreements dealing with SSBNs can have.
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Nonetheless, if Washington could gain concessions from the Soviets in
other areas by agreeing to low-cost confidence-building measures, or if
the U.S. perception of SSBN survivability could somehow be heightened by
such proposals, CBMs would be worth considering. Of the five CBMs
examined, only one appears to offer the prospect of heightening U.S. con-
fidence. Although the threat of plunging RVs being used against U.S.
SSBNs is certainly not too great, agreeing to such a ban would be desir-
able since it would foreclose a possible threat to U.S. submarines. How-
ever, this proposal is not likely to stand alone in START: rather, if it
is on the agenda, the Soviets might well make its acceptance contingent
on other proposals, much as they refused to entertain the U.S. proposal
during SALT II to ban flight tests of SLBMs in depressed trajectories,
unless it was linked to a series of measures relating to surprise attack.
The ban on the testing of plunging RVs is worthwhile, but its overall
significance is only marginal. Thus, the U.S. would probably be willing
to make only marginal concessions to reach an agreement banning the tests.
Two of the remaining proposals were thought to entail little, if any,
operational costs, per se. Nonetheless, banning the active sonar trail-
ing of SSBNs by attack submarines and prohibiting the deployment of
large, fixed, active sonars were both judged to be less than desirable
because U.S. acquiescence to these proposals could set an unacceptable
precedent for future negotiations. Specifically, this precedent could be
used as a foot in the door in an attempt to restrict all submarine track-
ing operations (e.g., S0SUS/P-3s), a precedent which would adversely
impact on the U.S. Navy's tactical ASW program. Of course, even if
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such a precedent were set, follow-on proposals could be rejected; yet,
because strategic arms negotiations have become a semi-permanent feature
of the superpower relationship, U.S. negotiators must always be sensitive
to agreements that may be used as an opening wedge to discuss unfavorable
proposals in subsequent negotiations.
The two remaining proposals were judged, in and of themselves, not to
be in the U.S. interest. An SSBN sanctuary proposal does not answer any
U.S. security needs. Establishing sanctuaries would validate Soviet SSBN
employment practices, while constraining U.S. ASW forces. Because of
this, any U.S. discussion of sanctuaries would necessarily be a concession,
requiring a tradeoff from the Soviet Union. The concept of agreeing to
half a sanctuary was suggested as something the U.S. might consider if
the Soviets were willing to offer significant compensation in other areas.
However, it appears doubtful that Moscow would offer much for such a
narrowly defined agreement. Even if the USSR were willing to make real
concessions to reach the limited sanctuary agreement, the U.S. might still
be reluctant to agree to a proposal restricting the movement of the U.S.
Navy on or under international waters.
Finally, the concept of agreeing to somehow relate the inventory U.S.
attack submarine to Soviet SSBN levels was rejected both in principle
and because it would be a most difficult proposal to negotiate. After re-
viewing the tactical ASW missions assigned to U.S. SSNs, and looking at
the assets that the Navy has available to fulfill these tasks, it was
suggested that the existing number of SSNs may not be adequate for those
tactical missions, quite apart from any use in an anti-SSBN role. The
Soviet Navy's large submarine force does not arouse great concern over
131

the survivability of U.S. SSBNs; but it does challenge the U.S.N, in its
tactical ASW missions of defending surface naval forces and ensuring that
sea lines of communication can be maintained during a war. It was noted
that for the U.S. to show any interest in restricting the SSN inventory,
the proposal would have to be an unequal one that required the Soviet Navy
to make substantial reductions while allowing the U.S. inventory to remain
at its present level. The Soviet Union is not likely to agree to such a
proposal.
The prospects for concluding any bilateral SSBN confidence -building
measures during START therefore seem remote. Since the survivability of
U.S. SSBNs does not hinge on such measures, and because many of the CBMs
discussed above could have real or potential harmful effects on the U.S.
Navy's freedom to pursue its tactical ASW missions, the SSBN CBMs dis-
cussed are not particularly desirable from the U.S. perspective. In a
very real sense, both sides have taken a series of unilateral actions over
the years to increase ths survivability of their SSBN forces. This trend
will continue, in all probability, and may be more constructive in terms
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